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I. INTRODUCTION
To the average American, oil is the single resource that
is most critical to both lifestyle and economic well-being.
No other society in history has become as mobile or as trans-
portation oriented. In a like manner, probably no society is
as vulnerable to disruptions in the availability of this
vital resource. This vulnerability comes at a time, ironi-
cally, when the United States must rely increasingly on
foreign sources for access to this vital resource. The vul-
nerability not only extends to manipulations and political
reasons by the Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) cartel, but also to potential
military and terrorist instigated disruptions as well.
As the dominant world seapower since World War II, the
United States has had little challenge to maintenance of sea
lanes of communications. Today, the growth of Soviet naval
capabilities and the ability of that nation to project power
through use of naval assets must be of concern to those in
the United States tasked with formulation of naval strategy.
So also must the acquisition of minor naval assets with for-
midable weapons capability by Third World nations whose
leaders may be inclined to demonstrate hostility through ir-
rational military acts. Clearly the military, of all segments
of American society, is most reliant on oil products for its
10

continued function. Total mechanization of land, sea and
air forces in the modern military ties any prosecution of a
military strategy directly to access to oil.
Closely associated with U.S. reliance, in both the eco-
nomic and military sense, on strategic access to oil re-
sources is strategic interest in the ability to transport
those resources. For this reason the structure of the United
States merchant marine, and of national policy toward the
merchant marine, is directly related to national security.
This work will be directed at an investigation of U.S. mer-
chant marine policy as it relates to the structure and ade-
quacy of U.S. merchant marine assets for the transportation
of oil. Particular attention will be paid to the strengths
and vulnerabilities of U.S. merchant marine assets, and to
the prospects for a change in their basic structure over
time.
A. HYPOTHESIS
The hypothesis under which research for this paper was
conducted is as follows:
If radical departures in current U.S. maritime policy are
not caused by a crisis situation of significant magnitude
or a collapse of the national economy, then the structure
of U.S. assets capable of transporting oil for American
economic and military purposes will continue to be adequate
for the remainder of this century as driven by market
forces in the industry.
This hypothesis makes two basic assumptions: (1) that cur-
rent U.S. capacity to transport oil for domestic consumption
11

is in fact adequate at this time, and; (2) that the structure
of assets responsible for that capacity is driven by U.S.
merchant marine policy.
B. METHODOLOGY
To prove the hypothesis under which the research was con-
ducted, it was first necessary to establish a valid link be-
tween U.S. maritime policy and the structuring of U.S.
merchant marine assets. An investigation of the history of
U.S. maritime policy and examination of trends in the mer-
chant marine resulting from individual legislative initia-
tives served this purpose well.
In that U.S. merchant marine policy has resulted in a
reliance on assets flying other than the U.S. flag for both
economic and military purposes, the second phase of research
was directed at the status in international law of such a
strategic relationship. As an exgenous variable with poten-
tial for influencing U.S. maritime policy to some extent,
particular emphasis was paid to the current and likely future
status of foreign flag registry in international law and
practice. Historically documented court interpretations of
this law as it applies to U.S. maritime policy was the basis
for conclusions drawn.
Perhaps the central issue of the research—capacity to
transport oil as compared with import requirements—was the
subject of computer-based data analysis. Multiple linear
12

regression modeling techniques were used to provide a basis
for projections of U.S. asset adequacy for the remainder of
this century. The same techniques were used in the analysis
of U.S. oil consumption and import trends. Comparison of the
data-based results was the basis for any conclusions drawn.
Finally, an assessment of vulnerability of tankship as-
sets in a crisis situation was conducted. Historical analogy
was used as a basis for establishing the potential areas of
vulnerability. This research method was chosen both because
of its heuristic value and because the significance of in-
sights thus provided is in the application to new situations.
Evaluation of potential threat scenarios also relied heavily
on historical cultural biases and the development of a cer-
tain adversary military style likely to manifest itself in
the future
.
Throughout the research for this paper, the significance
of historical evolution of policy as it relates to the gen-
eration of any data base was maintained. Validity is estab-
lished in historical fact.
13

II. U.S. NATIONAL MARITIME POLICY: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
A. THE NATURE OF U.S. MARITIME POLICY
In 1789 the first registry law for merchant shipping was
passed in the United States [Ref. 1]. This law reserved the
privilege of registry to vessels constructed domestically,
and established the U.S. cabotage principle still in effect
today whereby coastal trade is reserved to ships of the na-
tional fleet. This law prevailed until 1912, at which time
ships of foreign construction were admitted to U.S. registry
for use only in the foreign trades [Ref. 2] . Since that time
United States shipping policy has changed dramatically, pri-
marily because of the two World Wars experienced this century
and the increasing national reliance on resources and raw
materials not available domestically in sufficient quantity.
U.S. national maritime policy has developed and evolved in a
unique manner reflective of both the nation's economic and
military security needs. In viewing this historical develop-
ment, it is necessary to analyze: (1) the manner in which a
coherent policy has been adopted to cover the diverse in-
terests of the private and public sectors, and (2) the extent
to which the policy that has developed accomplishes national
economic and security goals.
In terms of national security, it is impossible to iso-
late the component of "American" shipping that is of direct
14

utility to the military without suboptimizing the relation-
ship between security and access to (and transportation of)
resources critical to the national economy. Therefore, the
following analysis of U.S. maritime policy and its relation-
ship to national security will include categories of shipping
assets as indicated below:
1. Shipping controlled directly by the Military Sealift
Command (MSC) and operated entirely to support military
operations
.
2. Shipping of the United States national fleet, and as
such under direct U.S. control and of U.S. registry.
3. Shipping of the "effective-control fleet" of the United
States which is owned in whole or in part by U.S. citi-
zens but, for a variety of reasons, has been registered
under a foreign flag.
These types of shipping assets, although diverse in many re-
spects, in combination provide the United States with the
shipping services on which the national defense must depend.
Therefore, to fully understand the nature of current U.S.
shipping policy and the interrelationship of the types of
assets incorporated in U.S. defense planning, a comprehensive
evolutionary background of the development of U.S. maritime
legislation and of registration under "runaway flags" is a
prerequisite. Although the primary concern of this work is
tankship assets and the ability to transport oil, it is
For reasons which will be explained in greater depth
later in this chapter, effective U.S. control shipping re-
fers only to ships registered in Panama, Liberia, Honduras
and Costa Rica. More recently, the term refers almost ex-
clusively to shipping of Liberian and Panamanian registry.
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impossible to separate or isolate a single component of the
shipping industry and develop a coherent description of how
that component has arrived at its current state in relation
to policy and registration. Additionally, other types of
shipping, such as break-bulk carriers and container ships,
are of immense importance to national security and should not
be deleted from consideration in the overall picture. These
type assets will be mentioned only peripherally, however, and
every effort will be made to concentrate on the national
security aspects of availability of means of seaborne trans-
portation of petroleum products.
B. THE ?4ERCHANT SHIPPING INDUSTRY—HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Throughout the history of the United States the federal
government has played a dominant role in the regulation of
the shipping industry. This industry has been considered of
such importance that the second and third acts of the First
Congress were enacted to lower duties on certain imports when
transported in ships of U.S. citizens rather than those owned
by foreign nationals and impose higher tonnage duties on
foreign vessels entering U.S. ports than on U.S. vessels
[Ref. 3]. These laws, like many that were to follow, were
intended to compensate for the inability of a fledgeling mer-
chant marine to compete with the well established merchant
fleets of the European powers. As a virtual island nation,
the United States was in obvious need of shipping links with
16

Europe. Availability of easily exploited domestic resources,
however, negated the vital aspects of a domestically con-
trolled fleet of considerable size.
Merchant shipping, nonetheless, did prosper at certain
periods in our nation's early history. Not possessed of a
great navy to protect this shipping on the high seas, it was
often vulnerable to attack from the more powerful European
and North African seafaring nations. Although, as mentioned
earlier, a registry law had already been passed in the United
States in 1789, registry under a foreign flag was seen as a
way to compensate for the inadequacies of protection under
the American flag as well as to evade restrictions imposed on
ships of U.S. registry. During the War of 1912, a number of
American merchant vessels actually flew the flag of Portugal
to evade American and British restrictions [Ref . 4] . This
type of "runaway registry" was an early precedent for the
registry system that has evolved for effective U.S. control
shipping today. It also marked the beginning of a number of
situational predicaments that have plagued the world registry
system throughout its history.
The United States, through its exercise of sovereignty,
has the power to compel its citizens to register whatever
ships they may own under the U.S. flag. In terms of national
security, this is certainly the most expedient method of con-
trolling shipping. Unfortunately, however, shipping, like
any other commodity, is subject to market forces. Demand for
17

shipping is highly elastic and therefore any legal or other
restrictions placed on assets owned by U.S. citizens would
undoubtedly place them in an inferior, and thus unacceptable,
market situation. The only way to preclude this is to ap-
proach U.S. shipping in the same manner as any other com-
modity to be included in a free trade situation, or to
subsidize it to place it on an equal footing with the compe-
tition. Subsidizing shipping inherently entails a signifi-
cant cost to be borne by the American public. The cost of
subsidizing a fleet commensurate with national security ob-
jectives would be immense. Competition for technical exper-
tise with the private sector, as well as competition for
resources with other American industries, significantly in-
creases the cost of ship construction in the United States.
This places the U.S. shipbuilding industry at a distinct
competitive disadvantage compared to foreign competition.
To establish viable U.S. shipbuilding industry, cost dif-
ferentials would have to be compensated for through subsidi-
zation. It is in this context that American national
maritime policy had developed.
C. STRUCTURING MARITIME POLICY—THE EARLY PERIOD
It is d general premise of international law that all
oceangoing ships must have some nationality to claim the
protection of that law [Ref . 5] . In 1905 in the Muscat Dhows
case, the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague decided
13

that the flag of registry of a ship, rather than its owner-
ship, certified the nationality of the ship [Ref. 6]. Thus
a ship may at the same time be owned by a citizen (or citi-
zens) of one (or several) nation (s), through a corporation
in another nation, crewed by nationals of yet another nation
or nations, and registered in yet another nation. The diver-
gence between this situation and one in which a ship is
owned, operated, crewed and registered entirely within the
auspices of the United States has obvious national security
and legal overtones. This problem did not become particu-
larly important until the emergence of a strong national
maritime industry with the U.S. departure from isolationism
at the turn of the centruy.
The Spanish-American War demonstrated not only a need for
a strong U.S. navy, but just as importantly for a strong mer-
chant marine to support its operations. Therefore, during
the Roosevelt Administration, a strong link between merchant
shipping and national security was established. During the
period from the Revolutionary War to the Civil War, American
shipping had prospered greatly. A necessary adjunct to the
commercial and economic interests of the nation, a strong
maritime tradition developed which rivaled that of the well
established seafaring nations. In 1855 alone, American ship-
yards delivered over 2,000 new ships and the U.S. flag fleet
grew to nearly half the size of that of Great Britain [Ref.
7], The Civil War, however, reversed this trend toward
19

maritime greatness. By War's end, the U.S. foreign trade
fleet was reduced, through destruction and transfer to flags
providing a safe haven, by nearly forty percent (from 2.5
million to 1.5 million gross tons) [Ref. 3]. The ensuing
period in American history saw concentration on and capital
investment in the westward expansion of the nation. The re-
sult was the further reduction of American shipping interests
and capacity. Thus, the Spanish-American War found the
United States in a position of inadequacy of maritime support
for military operations. The first real test of U.S. naval
strength outside home waters since the War of 1812 demon-
strated an embarrassing lack of support vessels for opera-
tions as close to the mainland as those conducted in the
blockade of Cuba, let alone those as far away as the Philip-
pines. To achieve ultimate victory, it was necessary for the
U.S. Navy to purchase and charter foreign vessels, every
obtainable American vessel in the Atlantic ports having been
chartered with a net result of only 36 ships totaling 90,000
tons [Ref. 9]
.
The British engagement in the Boer War (October 1899 -
May 1902) exacerbated the situation by diverting shipping
tonnage on which the United States was strongly reliant for
foreign trade. Although the necessity for a strong merchant
marine was communicated to Congress in 1903 by President
Roosevelt, who called for a determination of "the advantages
to this country of a strong merchant marine and an exact
20

knowledge of the costs and proper methods of carrying it on,"
many American observers were outraged when the Great White
Fleet could not get underway without attendance by a combina-
tion of colliers, tankers and tenders from such diverse
countries as Britain, Italy and Sweden [Ref. 10]. The de-
cision to begin conversion of the U.S. Navy from coal to oil
in 1911 and the first official passage by a U.S. ship through
the Panama Canal on August 15, 1914, also increased the grow-
ing awareness that the American shipping industry would of
necessity have to receive stimulus in order to keep pace with
the nation's commercial and military needs.
D. LEGISLATIVE INVOLVEMENT
1. The Progressive Era
At the same time that shipping inadequacies were be-
coming evident, the nation was developing an increased sense
of social justice. Those involved in the seafaring trades in
the United States had traditionally been subjected to poor
living standards, low wages, health and safety hazards that
could have been corrected, and excessive and arbitrary disci-
pline. These conditions existed primarily because of a lack
of any coherent governmental regulatory policy.
Prior to 1910, seamen working out of U.S. ports
earned only slightly higher wages than those of other na-
tions. Higher steel prices and construction costs, however,
produced a situation where ships produced in the United
21

states cost 40-70 percent more than those constructed in
Great Britain or Germany [Ref. 11]. Additionally, U.S. ves-
sels were considered inferior in design as they were not as
stable as European designs in heavy seas. Since only domes-
tically produced vessels could be registered in the U.S.,
this situation caused a flow of American shipping capital
overseas for the purpose of gaining commercial advantage
through purchase of foreign-built ships (which could be
registered only under a foreign flag) . Though revenues were
returned to the U.S. owners, control of shipping acquired in
this manner could be exercised by the nation of registry in
a conflict situation. Although the national security aspects
of this situation became more apparent as the world moved
closer to war, the immediate effect was to diminish the posi-
tion of American seamen vis-^-vis foreign seamen who would
accept lower compensation and, in some cases, worse working
conditions. Thus, foreign registry offered the shipowner not
only competitive advantage in relation to shipbuilding and
labor costs, but legal advantage in relation to regulations
as well.
Compounding this situation was a U.S. tariff struc-
ture that, although aiding domestic producers, decreased
somewhat foreign desire to trade with the United States.
This in turn decreased the necessity for shipping to engage
in foreign trade. Although a running debate to lower the
tariffs was conducted throughout the pre-war period.
22

adherents to the counter-argiiment for subsidization of the
shipping industry effectively negated any potential for a
remedy to the situation. A 1912 rider to the Panama Canal
Act granting to American shipowners the right to purchase
foreign-built ships on a duty-free basis for operation ex-
clusively in the foreign trade proved singularly unattractive
in that, even if ships could be purchased reasonably, U.S.
shipping restrictions still impinged on operational
profitability
.
Progressive Era social legislation in some respects
attempted to alleviate this situation, and in others effec-
tively increased the economic barriers that were preventing
a growth of the American flag fleet: (1) The La Follette
Seamen's Act of 1915, in response to pressures from the In-
ternational Seamen's Union, removed penalties for jumping
ship in the hope that this would provide incentive for
American seamen to accept lower wages in equilibrium with
world scale rates [Ref. 12], (2) Section 2 of the Seamen's
Act established eight-hour shifts, a six-day work week, and
scheduled holidays for merchant crews, and (3) Section 13 of
the Act required that 75 percent of the crew speak the same
language as the ship's officers, and that two-thirds hold
American able-bodied seaman's papers. Section 6 increased
required size of crews' quarters and strengthened earlier
legislation regarding crews' diet [Ref. 13]. The net effect
of this legislation, though much needed, was to place an even
23

more significant barrier between the American shipowner and
profitability under the existing legal system. Only American
registered ships operating in the coastal trade (which was
protected from foreign competition) could operate on an equal
basis with other ships in a like situation. Although ship-
ping costs were higher than those on the world market, ex-
clusion of competition caused the cost differential to be
borne by the forces of production rather than the American
shipping industry. Increased costs were in turn passed along
to the consumer in the form of higher prices.
2 . Increased Government Regulation
The Shipping Act of 1916 went even further in terms
of establishing regulatory legislation. While Woodrow Wil-
son's early policy subsequent to his election in 1912 was
concerned mainly with correcting deficiencies in existing
maritime legislation, the onset of the First World War
created a need for direct government involvement in the for-
mation of shipping policy through legislative action. Where
in 1910 only 15 percent of crews aboard U.S. flag ships were
American citizens, the reliability of crews composed to large
extent of nationalities engaged in the hostilities posed a
serious concern for the Administration [Ref. 14]. The Sea-
men's Act of 1915 was a significant step in ensuring relia-
bility of crews for the continuation of U.S. commerce. Two
previous statutes enacted in 1914, during U.S. neutrality,
authorized the Treasury Department to write war risk insurance
24

on American flag vessels and to liberalize rerms of transfer
of U.S. owned vessels registered abroad to U.S. registry
[Ref. 15].
Though this legislation was successful in large mea-
sure, the Shipping Act of 1916 provided the most comprehen-
sive legislation to date in establishing a coherent national
maritime policy. The creation of a Shipping Board, composed
of five members, centralized the administration and regula-
tion of the U.S. flag fleet [Ref. 16] . The Act authorized
the Board to build up the merchant fleet through purchase
,
lease or charter as an adjunct to military requirements. The
Board was also empowered by Section 6 to accept transfer of
ships not needed for purposes of defense from the War and
Navy Departments for retention or disposition as outlined in
Sections 7 through 9 [Ref. 17] . Section 10 of the Act enu-
merated the right of the President, upon declaration of an
emergency, to secure use for military or other purposes of
vessels administered by the Board [Ref. 18]
.
It is interesting to note that provisions of Section
9 of the Act permitted, for the first time, transfer of cer-
tain vessels approved by the Shipping Board to foreign
registry [Ref. 19] . Though the regulatory sections of the
Act concerned with establishing economic equity were impor-
tant, they were aimed primarily at shipping involved in the
coastal trades and had little immediate effect in comparison
to the establishment of the Shipping Board.
25

The Shipping Board was formally set up in January of
1917, and war was declared by the United States on 6 April,
1917 [Ref
. 20] . Almost immediately, a shipbuilding program
of considerable magnitude was initiated. An Emergency Fleet
Corporation was established and three thousand vessels were
authorized by the Board for construction (but less than one-
sixth were completed prior to the armistice of 11 November,
1918 [Ref. 21]). At completion of the program, when con-
tracts had run their course by May, 1922, the U.S. flag fleet
totaled 13.5 million gross tons of shipping over 1,100 tons
at a cost of approximately $3.3 billion [Ref. 22]. This
figure represented nearly five times prewar U.S. flag tonnage
and 22 percent of the world fleet, over half of which was
owned by the government [Ref. 23].
Thus the United States entered the post-war period
with shipping assets, particularly government owned assets,
far in excess of immediate perceived need. The confiscation
of practically the entire German merchant fleet and transfer
to Allied flags as a result of the Treaty of Versailles (June
1919) increased this shipping excess and created two situa-
tions of significance [Ref. 24] . First, the excess of ship-
ping tonnage, which was to reach 17 percent of the world's
total shipping by 1922, caused a competitive setting which
greatly reduced shipping rates, sometimes below the point of
profitability [Ref. 25] . Second, the excess capacity imme-
diately reduced the necessity for the large shipbuilding
26

capacity (which had developed during the war) . This had the
long-term effect of stagnating industry and preventing its
modernization with time as investment capital was scarce.
The result was a gradual decline in shipbuilding capacity
and migration of labor to other occupations. This eventually
contributed to significantly higher shipbuilding costs in
the United States and, when combined with an inability to
compete with cheap foreign labor for merchant crews, a desire
and in some cases a necessity for American shipping firms to
register their fleets abroad.
3. The Post-War Period
The operation of vessels acquired by the Shipping
Board through the Emergency Fleet Corporation was limited by
the Shipping Act of 1916 to the duration of the war plus five
years [Ref . 26] . The Act neglected, however, to provide suf-
ficient guidance for the transfer of excess government-owned
shipping to private operation once hostilities had ceased.
No balance had been established between the need for a viable
peacetime merchant marine operating under the U.S. flag and
the national security requirements inherent in the converti-
bility of this merchant marine to military purposes in time
of national emergency. The Merchant Marine Act of 1920
(Jones Act) attempted to clarify the procedures for conver-
sion of the fleet to private ownership [Ref. 27]
.
The Shipping Board was empowered to act as a "prudent
businessman" in disposing of both the ships of the Emergency
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Fleet Corporation and those confiscated from the Central
Powers , and to regulate shipping policy in the national in-
terest. A prohibition was also levied against transfer of
ships of great value to foreign flags. Recognizing a con-
scious need for establishment of long-term maritime policy,
the act was prefaced with a declaration of purpose as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress as-
sembled. That it is necessary for the national defense and
for the proper growth of its foreign and domestic commerce
that the United States shall have a merchant marine of the
best equipped and most suitable types of vessels suffi-
cient to carry the greater portion of its commerce and
serve as a naval or military auxiliary in time of war or
national emergency, ultimately to be owned and operated
privately by citizens of the United States; and it is here-
by declared to be the policy of the United States to do
whatever may be necessary to develop and encourage the
maintenance of such a merchant marine, and, in so far as
may not be inconsistent with the express provisions of
this Act, the United States Shipping Board shall, in the
disposition of vessels and shipping property as herein-
after provided, in the making of rules and regulations,
and in the administration of the shipping laws keep always
in view this purpose and object as the primary end to be
attained. [Ref. 28]
Although the Act was clearly intended to establish a strong
American flag fleet as an adjunct to national security, loop-
holes in its administration allowed the transfer of several
major vessels to the flags of other nations [Ref. 29]. This,
in reality, marked the beginning of a "phantom" U.S. fleet
—
a fleet for all intensive purposes under United States con-
trol, but nonetheless flying the flags of foreign nations.
The Merchant Marine Act, with minor amendments and
some shifting of emphasis, remains the basis for present-day
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maritime policy [Ref . 30] . It also provided the guidelines
by which the Shipping Board administered the divestiture of
the excess in government owned shipping. The Harding admin-
istration failed to formulate a concise policy for sale of
shipping assets and the Senate in fact subsequently investi-
gated alleged mismanagement of this and other areas of
responsibility. The Coolidge administration was likewise
unable to arrive at a policy to accomplish its desired goals.
The Hoover administration, however, was more pragmatic in its
approach to the problem. While each of the post World War I
administrations had attempted to solve the excess tonnage
problem by transfer of ships to private ownership. President
Hoover realized that government assistance was necessary to
place American shipping on equal terms with that of foreign
competition. He also felt that assistance to assets unpro-
fitable in comparison to foreign competition, primarily cargo
and tankship assets, should receive preference in receiving
government assistance over more competitive types of opera-
tions. In no respect was his policy intended to undermine
the standards that had been established by the La Follette
Seamen's Act. It was, rather, intended to provide financial
assistance to an area of commerce essential to the nation in
both economic and defense terms, the cost of which would be





The program developed under Hoover, as Secretary of
Commerce under Presidents Harding and Coolidge even prior to
his own election to the Presidency in 1928, was centered on
operation of the government-owned merchant fleet as a busi-
ness under a newly-instituted Fleet Corporation [Ref . 31]
.
The Shipping Board would be stripped of its responsibility
for ship operation and general maritime services , and would
be limited to a regulatory function [Ref. 32] . Sale of ves-
sels would not be conducted on a separate ship basis, but,
rather, as part of established government lines with custo-
mers, contracts, and port docking arrangements already in
effect and with government initiated American exporter sup-
port [Ref. 33] . Ships not needed to establish such lines
would be sold as scrap or to foreign interests not in compe-
tition with the American operations.
The Merchant Marine Act of 1928 was passed to stimu-
late Hoover's program. It established a Construction Loan
Fund and instituted a mail contract system on certified
routes to subsidize operation determined to be of necessity
in relation to government and private economic interests.
The onset of the depression in late 1929 prevented full im-
plementation of Hoover's maritime plan. By the end of his
administration, however, the surplus fleet had been reduced,
over fifteen private shipping lines had been established, the
number of government-operated lines had been cut, an annual
$25 million postal contract system had been approved, and the
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operating and regulatory functions of the Shipping Board had
been separated [Ref . 34]
.
4. The Road to War
President Hoover offered a strictly commercial direc-
tion to U.S. maritime policy. Time having changed attitudes,
he was not constrained as Harding and Coolidge by defense
considerations in the immediate aftermath of World War I.
When Franklin D. Roosevelt took office in 1933, however, the
setting was rapidly changing. The growing threat of war in
Europe caused a rethinking of maritime policy which resulted
in a restructuring with primary emphasis on national defense
and military exigencies. Roosevelt also favored an explicit
system of subsidies rather than indirect aid to the maritime
industry through such programs as the awarding of mail con-
tracts. The legislation which resulted, the Merchant Marine
Act of 1936, set in place the most comprehensive system of
maritime law yet provided in this nation. Promotional mea-
sures were codified, administrative procedures established,
and regulatory procedures instituted which form the founda-
tions of current maritime policy. The main thrust of mari-
time policy since 1936 is as contained in Section 101
—
Declaration of Policy:
TITLE I—DECLARATION OF POLICY
SECTION 101. It is necessary for the national defense and
development of its foreign and domestic commerce that the
United States shall have a merchant marine (a) sufficient
to carry its domestic waterborne commerce and a substantial
portion of the water-borne export and import foreign
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coiranerce of the United States and to provide shipping ser-
vice on all routes essential for maintaining the flow of
such domestic and foreign water-borne commerce at all
times, (b) capable of serving as a naval and military
auxiliary in time of war or national emergency, (c) owned
and operated under the United States flag by citizens of
the United States insofar as may be practicable, and (d)
composed of the best-equipped, safest, and most suitable
types of vessels, constructed in the United States and
manned with a trained and efficient citizen personnel. It
is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States
to foster the development and encourage the maintenance of
such a merchant marine. [Ref. 35]
To stimulate the American merchant marine, a system
of fiscal aids was established. The first of these, author-
ized by Title V of the Act, was the construction differential
subsidy, which was intended to aid shipowners in the purchase
of new vessels and thus ensure the modernization of the
American flag fleet through periodic replacement. The con-
struction subsidy was provided to compensate shipowners for
the difference in costs between U.S. and foreign shipyard
construction. By equating shipbuilding costs domestically
and abroad, the "differential" could be made up by the gov-
ernment in the form of a payment directly to the shipowner.
In this way, shipowners could be encouraged to utilize U.S.
shipyards rather than cheaper facilities abroad. In effect
the result was to subsidize the shipbuilding rather than
shipowning business in the United States. The availability
of the subsidy maintained U.S. shipbuilding capacity and al-
lowed that industry to compete for technical talent with
other industries offering wages in excess of those offered
abroad for similar skills. Subsidized construction was
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provided only for operators holding operating subsidy con-
tracts under the Act, and contracts for construction of
merchant vessels could only be let after competitive bidding.
The subsidy was computed by comparing actual cost of a vessel
built in an American shipyard with construction of a similar
vessel built abroad without regard for U.S. shipbuilder ex-
penses. The difference was expressed in terms of a fraction
of the domestic construction cost, and was originally limited
to 33 1/3 percent of that cost. This limit was subsequently
raised to a maximum of 55 percent of vessel construction cost
after 1960.^
The second type of aid provided was in the form of
an operating differential subsidy. Title VI of the Act au-
thorized this subsidy, while Title IV had set a date of 30
June, 1937, for cancellation of the ocean-mail contract sys-
tem that had preceded it in purpose [Ref . 36] . In its at-
tempt to establish private shipping lines and a commercially
viable American flag merchant marine after the First World
VJar, the Shipping Board was faced with the reality that a
privately owned U.S. merchant marine could not compete on
equal terms with foreign competition. The Merchant Marine
Act of 1928 had established the mail contract system to
2Discussion of the construction differential subsidy is
based on material provided in Chapter Four of Bread Upon the
Waters: Federal Aid to the Maritime Industries , by Gerald R.
Jantscher, which is highly recommended for a complete discus-




offset foreign competitive advantage, but the administration
of this system was both inefficient and ineffective [Ref
.
37] . The result, taken after Congressional debate and a
final decision to support a privately owned rather than a
government owned and operated merchant fleet, was the system
of direct public subsidies enacted in the Merchant Marine
Act of 19 36. Safeguards were implemented, and, as originally
approved, the subsidy was limited to liner services (passen-
ger and cargo). Liners are defined as "common carriers,
sailing along fixed routes on regular schedules and accepting
cargoes from many different shippers for delivery at ports
along their routes" as opposed to irregular carriers which
sail "wherever business takes them" [Ref. 38]. Thus vital
trade routes could be maintained by a subsidy calculated to
just offset the difference between operation of American and
foreign ships.
The areas determined as in need of subsidization by
the Act included shipping repairs not covered by insurance,
higher insurance costs, crew wages, and subsistence for offi-
cers and crew. The operating differential subsidy remained
in effect virtually unchanged until 1970, when provisions
were modified for expansion of eligibility and the subsis-
tence differential was eliminated.
3Jantscher, op. cit.. Chapter Three, provides the ma-




The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 also created the
United States Maritime Commission to oversee and administer
the American maritime program. It assumed the functions of
the Shipping Board, as broadened under provisions of the Act.
The Commission retained responsibility until 1950, when it
was abolished by executive order and its responsibilities
divided between the Maritime Administration (promotional
duties) functioning as part of the Department of Commerce,
and the Federal Maritime Board (regulatory functions)
.
Although additional Titles of the Act covered working
conditions for American Seamen (Title III) and contracting
for service routes and subsidies (Title VIII)
,
perhaps the
most significant single feature of the Act from a defense
standpoint was contained in Title IX—Miscellaneous Provi-
sions. Section 902(a) of that Title stipulates that:
SEC. 902. (a) It shall be lawful for the Commission to
requisition any vessel documented under the laws of the
United States, during any national emergency declared by
proclamation of the President, and when so taken or used,
the owner shall be paid the fair actual value of the ves-
sel at the time of taking, or paid the just compensation
for the vessel's use based upon such fair actual value (ex-
cluding any national defense features previously paid for
by the United States) , less a deduction from such fair
actual value of any construction differential subsidy al-
lowed under this Act, and in no case shall such fair actual
value be enhanced by the causes necessitating the taking.
In the case of a vessel taken and used, but not purchased,
the vessel shall be restored to the owner in a condition at
least as good as when taken, less reasonable wear and tear,
or the owner shall be paid an amount for reconditioning
sufficient to place the vessel in such condition. The
owner shall not be paid for any consequential damages
arising from such taking or use. [Ref. 39]
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Section 902 thereby expressly stated the relationship of the
American merchant marine to the defense requirements of the
country, and conditions under which ships "documented under
the laws of the United States" could be converted to military
control. The term "documented under the laws of the United
States," however, limited the President's authority to ships
of the U.S. flag fleet. This was subsequently changed by an
amendment to the Act on 7 August, 1939, which expanded Presi-
dential authority as follows:
Whenever the President shall proclaim that the security of
the national defense makes it advisable or during any na-
tional emergency declared by proclamation by the President,
it shall be lawful for the commission to requisition or
purchase any vessel or other watercraft owned by citizens
of the United States, or under construction within the
United States, or for any period during such emergency, to
requisition or charter the use of any such property. [Ref
.
40]
With this modification, the concept of "effective"
Presidential control over shipping assets owned by U.S. citi-
zens and registered abroad was established. This concept is
retained in U.S. law and is the basis for current defense
mobilization guidance.
E. THE EVOLUTION OF FOREIGN FLAG REGISTRY
1 . Genuine Link
Arguing a contrario from art. 5, para. 1 of the unratified
Convention on the High Seas, 4 one can define flags of
4United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Offi-
cial Records 2:135 (1958) (Doc. A/CONF. 13/L.53). Exerpt




convenience as . . . such flags "under which there exists
no genuine link between the state and the ships, and, in
particular, under which the state does not effectively
exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative,
technical, and social matters over ships flying its flag."
[Ref. 41]
Registration of ships by nationals of one country
under the flag of another country is not a new occurrence.
Historically documented cases of such registration are nu-
merous. In the sixteenth century, English merchants often
sailed under the Spanish flag in order to avoid monopolistic
Spanish restrictions on the lucrative West Indies trade [Ref.
42] . In the seventeenth century, Newfoundland fishermen
sailed under the French flag to avoid deportation by their
home country, England, because of feared competition in the
fishing industry [Ref. 43]. During the Napoleonic period,
English vessels were registered under the colors of the Ger-
man principalities of Knyphausen and Pappenburg to avoid the
French continental blockade [Ref. 44]. Even as late as 1871,
Swiss ships were registered under other European flags, in-
cluding German, because the Swiss Federal Council refused
registry under the Swiss flag because there was at that time
some doubt whether a landlocked country had the right to
grant nationality to its ships [Ref. 45] . One feature that
all nations granting the use of their flag to citizens of
another nation had in common, however, was a strong maritime
tradition. Thus a "genuine link" was established between
the "runaway" ships and the nation granting use of its flag
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in that it could both defend and exercise control over the
shipping that had been attracted by its flag.
Shipowners desiring registry of their vessels abroad
also have historically had several things in common: (1) they
generally seek registry abroad to avoid undesirable condi-
tions imposed by domestic registry; and (2) they usually
choose to register in a country offering some form of ad-
vantage over the nation of which they are citizens. In the
twentieth century, the foreign registry system has evolved in
such a manner that advantage may be offered without the nor-
mal requisites of ability to protect and control. This
startling new development has shaken the very roots of the
foreign registry system, and has brought about a controversy
which has yet to be resolved.
2. The Evolution of Panamanian Registry
In 1901, U.S. interests owned and registered abroad
136 ships of 672,000 gross tons [Ref. 46]. For all intents
and purposes, the entirety of these ships of foreign registry
were attached to the flags of established maritime nations.
Gradually, through a peculiar set of circumstances, this was
to change. On 4 November, 1903, Panamanian Independence from
Colombia was declared, ostensibly with U.S. backing and mili-
tary guaranty. On 18 November, 1903, Secretary of State John
Hay signed the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty with Panama "granting
to the United States in perpetuity the use, occupation and
control" of a canal to be built on the Panamanian isthmus.
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In this new treaty, except in the preamble, no mention was
made of Panama's sovereignty. Panama "granted" to the United
States "all the rights, power and authority within the
(canal) zone . . . which the United States would possess and
exercise if it were the sovereign of the territory ... to
the exclusion of the exercise by . . . Panama of any such
sovereign rights, power, or authority." Thus a link was
directly established between the two nations, with Panama
considered by the United States government to be a functional
dependency. The development of a shipping registry system
whereby U.S. shipowners were attracted to the Panamanian
flag to evade restrictive U.S. legislation was, therefore, a
natural course of events.
In 1919 the Belen Quezeda became the first foreign-
owned ship to be registered in Panama [Ref . 47] . Prior to
that time, Panama had an extremely modest association with
the seafaring tradition, her experience being limited to
coastal trade. In addition to the close relationship de-
veloped subsequent to the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, a pecu-
liarity of Panamanian low facilitated registry under her
flag. Based on Colombian Law, the Panamanian Fiscal Code al-
lowed vessels to be registered through Panamanian consuls
abroad [Ref. 48]. This law was originally intended to permit
Discussion of the relationship between the United States
and Panama regarding exercise of sovereignty is based on




purchase of vessels abroad by Panamanian citizens for subse-
quent permanent registry when the vessel finally arrived in
Panama. Additionally, American consular officers were
charged with representing Panamanian interests in ports
where no Panamanian consuls were assigned on instructions
issued in 1916 [Ref . 49] . This further enhanced the attrac-
tiveness of Panamanian registry when, also in 1916, Panama
opened its flag to ships owned by Panamanian corporations
which were in turn owned by foreigners [Ref. 50],
The Belen Quezada, transferred from Canadian to Pana-
manian registry in late 1919, was owned through a Canadian
corporation in which U.S. citizens retained a minority inter-
est. The ship was seized in February, 1921, by Costa Rica
during a longstanding border dispute with Panama. While Costa
Rica claimed the ship as a valid prize of war, Panama main-
tained that the United States retained an obligation to look
g
after its citizens even though they were minority owners.
The State Department position, that the interests of Ameri-
can owners of a Panamanian-registered ship legitimately
were protected by the United States, resulted in a fruit-
less deadlock in this case, but it was based on a sound
tradition of maritime law and would serve as a precedent
to be cited later. To penetrate behind the flag of regis-
try to the nation of the owner in a search for responsi-
bility and the claim to diplomatic protection was to become
an essential ingredient in the later fully evolved flag of
convenience. [Ref. 51]
^Discussion summarizes a more complete treatment of the
Belen Quezada case as contained in Chapter 1 of Sovereignty
for Sale, by Rodney P. Carlisle.
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Subsequent to the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, the
Shipping Board found itself in an awkward position. In
establishing the Board, Congress had stipulated a mandate
against transfer of the most valuable shipping assets to
foreign flags. Yet the Shipping Board was also required to
divest a large government owned shipping excess in a world
market experiencing a shipping glut. Thus the Board at-
tempted to retain the valuable assets through charter-
purchase arrangements set up with private firms. Some of
these firms, however, accumulated debts to the point of
bankruptcy. The debts having attached to the vessel, the
Board was faced with their sale as government funds could
not legally be used to pay off the debts in this case because
the Board had been made a receiver of the ships in question.
To sell the ships at the current low market value would have
amounted to placing the buyer in a favorable position at the
expense of his operational competition. To circumvent this
situation, the Board authorized for sale in 1922 six major
freighters to American firms with the stipulation that they
be subsequently re-registered under a foreign flag to take
them out of direct competition with American flag ships.
Pacific Freighters, a San Francisco based company, purchased
the vessels and subsequently re-registered them in Panama.
An official of the company stated that the attraction to the
Panamanian flag was relief from periodic boiler and hull in-
spections and regulations relating to crews ' quarters and
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subsistence, as well as rather low registry fees and yearly
net tonnage taxes.
Thus, for the first time, a valuable ship had managed
to achieve transfer to a flag providing a more competitive
situation even though this was not the legislative intent of
Congress. Still, legislation prevented large-scale defec-
tions to other flags, and, as was the American practice since
1884, signature of a standard employment contract enforcing
congressionally approved standards in the presence of an
American consul or shipping commissioner by an American sea-
man signing on with any vessel was still required [Ref . 52]
.
Additionally, requests for arbitration on unfair business
practices proved costly and time-consuming thus eliminating
the possibility of widespread labor manipulation through
registry in Panama or anywhere else, for that matter.
A more visible transfer to Panamanian registry oc-
curred in October, 1922, with the transition from the U.S.
to the Panamanian flag of two passenger liners, the Reliance
and the Resolute. Built in Germany, these ships were trans-
ferred to the Dutch after launching in 1920 to avoid Allied
confiscation. This transfer was found to be unacceptable by
the Allies, however, and the liners were subsequently sold to
the American Ship and Commerce Corporation owned by W. Averell
Harriman. At the time of the sale, the Shipping Board
Discussion based on material presented in Chapter 1 of
Sovereignty for Sale by Rodney P. Carlisle.
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stipulated that transfer to foreign registry would be allowed
within a period of three years if American Ship could not
operate the vessels at a profit under American registry. At
the time, the Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead Act in
effect since January of 1920 enforcing it was interpreted by
the Department of the Treasury and the Attorney General to
extend to American ships on the high seas , which were identi-
fied as territories as covered under the Prohibition Amend-
ment and the Volstead Act.
To avoid the potential loss of profit inherent in
such a ruling, Harriman transferred the ships to the flag of
Panama immediately on acquisition. As a measure of national
prestige, the liners drew considerable public attention in
their transfer of registry. Although the extension of Pro-
hibition to American ships outside the three-mile limit was
overturned in mid-1923, an important precedent had been set.
The Harriman Corporation, in attempting to justify the trans-
fer, stated that "The Panama flag will probably be the one
most acceptable to the interests of the United States both in
the development of its trade and as regards availability in
time of military necessity" [Ref . 53] . Though this assertion
of national policy may have been influenced by the State or
War Departments , its accuracy was to be proven beyond a doubt
g
less than two decades hence.
gDiscussion based on material presented in Chapter 1 of
Sovereignty for Sale by Rodney P. Carlisle.
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3. Panama—Sovereign State or American Puppet?
Under pressure from the United States to clarify its
maritime code, Panama passed a comprehensive maritime law in
January, 1925 [Ref . 54] . This law clarified what had pre-
viously been a haphazard set of individual legislative ini-
tiatives, and was clearly designed to favor the convenience
and interests of shipowners and increase registration fees in
a period of economic stagnation in Panama while still at-
tracting shipowners to the Panamanian flag.
With the number of ships of Panamanian registry on
the increase , the United States sought to exercise a measure
of influence over the jurisdictional rights of Panama over
her flag vessels. In June of 1924, a convention was signed
with Panama allowing the United States to board vessels fly-
ing the flag of Panama suspected of liquor running or smug-
gling up to one hour's steaming time outside the recognized
three-mile national territorial limit [Ref. 55] . This was
similar to agreements reached with seventeen other nations
between 1924 and 1930 [Ref. 56]. Again under U.S. pressure,
an act was passed by Panama in December of 1926 authorizing
"the cancellation of Panama registry of vessels habitually
engaged in smuggling, illicit commerce, or piracy" [Ref. 57].
The United States liberally interpreted this law and
the previous agreement with Panama in actual practice. This,
in turn, resulted in a direct confrontation with Panama over
the issue of sovereignty. While the United States operated
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under the assumption that "known smugglers" were automati-
cally deprived of Panamanian registry and could thus be
boarded on the high seas as without flag, Panama determined
that the convention of 1924 prohibited this and procedurally
progressive steps would be instituted after a complaint was
passed to the Panamanian government before registration would
be revoked. A clear distinction was made between Panamanian
sovereignty over ships flying the Panamanian flag and U.S.
sovereignty over citizens owning those ships in this inter-
pretation. Aware that Article 18 of Panama's constitution
permitted the United States to be called in to supervise
Panama's elections, a provision that could be exercised
liberally, and that the sovereignty issue was extremely sen-
sitive in Panamanian politics, the U.S. decided not to press
the matter but to rely on the good will of the Panamanian
government to adhere to U.S. interests. Thus the United
States at once recognized the dependency relationships of
Panama and Panamanian sovereignty in relation to ships flying
its flag.
Other occurrences during the 1920s that accompanied
the evolution of Panama's maritime law included an increase
in designated consuls capable of expediting registration and
the assignment of separate radio call signs by the Inter-
national Bureau of Radiotelegraphy in 1923 [Ref . 58] . With
9Discussion based on Chapter 1 of Sovereignty for Sale
by Rodney P. Carlisle.
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all the refinements in Panamanian ship registration proce-
dures, only about thirty transfers from American to Pana-
manian registry were authorized by the Shipping Board during
the 1920s [Ref. 59], This was so primarily because of re-
strictions imposed by the Shipping Board. American registry
required that a majority share in ownership be held by a
U.S. citizen. This was not a requirement imposed by many
other nations, however, and the ability to purchase and reg-
ister ships abroad through foreign-based corporations pro-
vided a potential for lucrative transfer to the flag of
Panama.
4. Expansion of Panamanian Registry
In disposing of excess government owned shipping in
the 1920s, the Shipping Board approved significantly more
transfers to established flags of registry (England, Norway,
etc.) than to Panama. The financial incentives, as well as
the military security provided by the United States for
Panama under the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903, made the
attractiveness of Panamanian registry commercially obvious
at an early stage. Two large-scale transfers to the flag of
Panama demonstrated potential advantage even more.
In 1928, United Fruit Company transferred six large
banana transport vessels from British to Panamanian registry,
Seven more were transferred between 1930 and 1931 [Ref. 60]
.
Since these vessels had been initially constructed and reg-
istered outside the United States, no Shipping Board
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authorization was required for the transfer. The desire by-
United Fruit to expand plantation holdings in Panama, and the
fact that operations were actually conducted out of Panama
and the surrounding area, undoubtedly played a part equally
as important as the reduction of operating costs in facili-
tating the decision. In 1935, a larger fleet of 25 tankship
vessels totalling 230,000 tons was transferred by Standard
Oil of New Jersey (ESSO) from the Free City of Danzig to
Panama [Ref. 61],
Article 105 of the Treaty of Versailles stipulated
that inhabitants of territories severed from Germany under
the terms of the Treaty would become citizens of the terri-
tory in which they resided [Ref. 62], Because of this, they
would not be subject to German reparations payments, includ-
ing confiscation of ships. No prohibition was enforced
against the transfer by sale of ships still under construc-
tion in Germany prior to the Treaty coming into force on 10
January, 1920. This loophole was used to transfer four ships
to ownership in Danzig, and profits were reinvested in ships
constructed subsequently in Germany by Bapico, the Baltic
subsidiary of Standard Oil [Ref. 63]. In that Danzig was
tied politically to Poland, the adherence by that country to
the Hague Convention of 190 7 which permitted the impounding
of vessels of an enemy on the outbreak of hostilities in
early 1935 presented Standard Oil with a serious problem
[Ref. 64] . Rather than risk the possibility of having assets
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confiscated should Poland find herself at war, the option to
transfer assets to Panama (where they could be operated not
only with U.S. protection but also under a sovereign flag
unlikely to be engulfed in a European conflict) was taken.
This group of ships was to play an important part in support
of U.S. interests during the Second World War. It also
doubled the tonnage under registration in Panama at that
time [Ref . 65]
.
The Roosevelt administration during the late 1930s
was motivated by a growing concern for the military utility
of available shipping assets as the possibility of a war in
Europe came closer to reality. Therefore, few transfers away
from American registry were permitted. Nonetheless, American
companies, as well as those of other nations, were beginning
to realize the potential for manipulating both commerical and
political situations to advantage through utilization of
Panama's rapidly evolving system of shipping registration.
As fear of war increased during the rise of Facism and Na-
zism, as well as during the Spanish Civil War (1936-39) , the
Panamanian flag became a refuge for many shipping interests
desirous of negating the potential for significant commercial
loss. Documentation indicates transfer to the Panamanian
flag of registry by shipowners from Sweden, Germany, Denmark,
Holland, France, Algeria, Egypt, Turkey, Rumania, Bulgaria,
Japan, and even China after the Japanese invasion of 1937,
took place between 1935 and 1939 [Ref. 66].
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F. EVASION OF NEUTRALITY
Germany invaded Poland on 1 September, 1939, and Britain
responded by declaring war on Germany on 3 September. Neu-
trality legislation, prohibiting American vessels from opera-
tion in the war zone, was enacted in November [Ref . 67]
.
American rearmament was initiated with a $1 billion supple-
mental appropriation in May, 1940, and Lend-Lease was author-
ized for Britain the following January with 50 tankers
released to the British in May [Ref. 68] . Previous neu-
trality legislation, enacted in 1935 and 1937, however, set
the tone for maritime policy during the period of U.S. neu-
trality prior to declaration of war in December, 1941, by
requiring the President to announce a state of war and em-
bargo the sale of weapons to belligerents on either side
[Ref. 69].
The neutrality legislation of 1939 had a provision where-
by the United States would permit the sale of goods, includ-
ing weapons, could be transacted on a "cash-and-carry" basis.
This being accompanied by a prohibition against operation of
American vessels in a declared war zone in the eastern At-
lantic, and the British exercising effective control of the
seas at that time, the Cash-and-Carry Act was intended to aid
the British in the war effort without overtly rejecting the
American position as a neutral in the conflict. Because
British shipping was already spread thin and American ships
were prohibited from trade directly with Europe , the status
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of Panama as a neutral not subject to American neutrality
legislation regarding shipping was seen as a means of con-
ducting trade, especially in agricultural and petroleum
products, without risking U.S. involvement in the war effort.
Where initially ships of Canadian and British registry
owned by American citizens were utilized as a means of con-
ducting cash-and-carry without violating neutrality, the
benefits of Panamanian registry for this purpose were not
seen until later. An emergency meeting of Pan-American
states was held in September and October, 1939, in Panama
which effectively extended the territorial waters of American
states south of Canada to 300 miles, in violation of previous
practice and traditional international law, and extended the
recognized right of angory to neutral seizure of belligerent
shipping by recognizing as legal all transfers of ships to an
American republic [Ref . 70] . Previously, the right of bel-
ligerents to seize neutral ships within their territorial
waters was accepted under international law. The right of
neutrals to do this, however, was not an established legal
practice at the time, and was in fact subsequently rejected
by the British and French [Ref. 71]. While this provision of
the inter-American agreement was instituted to facilitate
seizure of German shipping in the American theater, it proved
to be far more useful in the transfer of ships of American
registry to the flag of Panama to aid the Allied war effort
without violating neutrality. Standard Oil Company of New
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Jersey (ESSO) , along with other proprietary lines and indi-
vidual shipowners, joined those who had earlier in the 1930s
transferred ships to Panamanian registry to enhance their
commercial position. The Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as
amended in 1939, would provide, on subsequent declaration of
war by the United States, a means of effectively returning
the portion of Panamanian shipping that was of U.S. ownership
to American control. In fact, some forty Danish ships seized
in U.S. ports under the provisions of the Pan-American con-
ference were subsequently transferred to Panamanian registry
to be used in the effort to resupply the Allied war effort
[Ref. 72]. This was a clear case of American exercise of the
political relationship with Panama to avoid overt rejection
of neutrality.
G. THE EMERGENCE OF THE UNITED STATES MERCHANT MARINE
—
NEW EMPHASIS ON DEFENSE
1. World War II
Throughout the Second World War the merchant marine
served this nation well. After U.S. entry into World War II,
some two million tons of U.S. controlled open registry ship-
ping sailed alongside U.S. flag vessels throughout the war
[Ref. 73]. In early 1942, a War Shipping Administration
(WSA) was established by President Roosevelt as an adjunct
to the Maritime Commission, both of which were placed under
the chairmanship of Admiral Emory Land [Ref. 74] . The WSA
directed American wartime maritime policy and was responsible
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for shipping acquisition including construction and charter
arrangements. The Maritime Commission had started the ex-
pansion of the U.S. merchant marine with a program to con-
struct 50 ships per year beginning in 1939 [Ref . 75] . Before
U.S. entry into the war, approximately six million deadweight
tons of shipping had been contracted [Ref. 76]
.
Between 1942 and the end of hostilities in 1945, over
five thousand ships were delivered at a construction cost in
excess of $12 billion [Ref. 77]. At peak production, U.S.
shipyards were operating at a construction rate which was
capable of reproducing the entire prewar tonnage of the U.S.
flag merchant fleet in only sixteen weelcs and the entire
world fleet in under three years [Ref. 78].
In March of 1942, the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 was
amended to allow war-risk insurance to be offered to American-
owned vessels of defense utility registered in Central and
South American nations [Ref. 79]. Only Panama, Honduras,
Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Guatemala, however, had provisions
of law permitting registry of foreign owned vessels [Ref.
80]. Panama's flag attracted by far the most foreign ship-
ping, with the Panamanian fleet reaching over 250 ships by
mid-1942 [Ref. 81]. During the war, over 150 Panamanian-
registered ships were captured or sunk, with a loss of over
1,500 crewmen [Ref. 82].
Data from the War Shipping Administration indicates
that in 1944 outbound war-related dry tonnage included:
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Army, 22.7 million tons; Navy, 6.6 million, tons; Lend-Lease,
16.4 million tons [Ref. 83]. Only 15 percent of the 3,500
ship U.S. dry cargo fleet was placed under military custody
[Ref. 84] . Tanker construction alone in the United States
accounted for 394 ships between September 1939 and 1941, and
a total of 10,044 during the period 1942 to 1945 [Ref. 85].
Total U.S. tanker tonnage in September, 1939, had been only
2,755,000 tons in 377 ships [Ref. 86]. Of these and addi-
tional tankers to be built subsequently, as many as 304 were
placed in British control and service before war was declared
by the United States [Ref. 87] . To totally appreciate the
magnitude of the shipbuilding effort in the United States
during World War II, a statistical comparison is necessary:
On September 1, 1939, the U.S. fleet was the second largest
in the world, with 13.9 percent of the gross registered
tonnage of all the world's oceangoing commercial steam and
and motor ships of 1,000 gross tons and over. Only the
fleet of the United Kingdom was larger, with nearly twice
the tonnage of the American fleet. On December 1, 1946,
the U.S. fleet contained 50.6 percent of the world's
tonnage. [Ref. 88]
Despite emerging from the war with over half of the
world's shipping, U.S. wartime losses were great. Total war-
time losses of tanker ships alone came to 1,421,000 dead-
weight tons [Ref. 89]. This does not include over 30,000
deadweight tons lost during the period of neutrality, or the
516,000 deadweight tons of Panamanian tanker tonnage lost




The concept of effective control over shipping of
U.S. ownership, which had openly been encouraged to transfer
to Panamanian registry, was thus proven to be of great prac-
tical value. The political links, even to the point of
shared sovereignty between the United States and Panama, as
well as the dependence of Panama militarily on the U.S. and
inability of that nation to challenge the United States navy
on the high seas, made the relationship ideal for facilitat-
ing war related commerce. In reality, the War Shipping Ad-
ministration dictated Panamanian maritime policy during the
war. At completion of hostilities, however, the continuation
of this relationship was to be called into question.
2 . The Post War Period—Military Exigencies of Effective
Control
While U.S. shipping had quadrupled in tonnage during
the war years, the rest of the world's merchant tonnage had
been diminished by one-third [Ref. 91]. In rebuilding the
world's economic structure after the war, this factor was
taken into consideration. By war's end, the U.S. flag fleet
included nearly 4,500 vessels suitable for commercial use
[Ref. 92] . The Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946 was passed to
provide guidance for the disposition and sale of the govern-
ment's 4,000-ship merchant fleet to U.S. citizens and Ameri-
can allies [Ref. 93] . By the end of the authority granted by
the Act, the Maritime Commission had sold more than 1,100
ships for foreign registry and 823 to U.S. citizens [Ref.
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94]. By December, 1949, the U.S. flag fleet included 644
dry cargo ships, 37 combination passenger and cargo ships,
and 420 tankers as well as 111 government-owned ships on
charter to private companies [Ref . 95] . Sales from the U.S.
inventory had also brought the assets of other maritime
powers up to pre-war standards.
The importance of the merchant marine had been so
vividly demonstrated during the war that new emphasis was
placed on the defense related aspects of that industry. As
before the war, the competitive setting faced by shipowners
made foreign flag registry seem attractive. Since the effi-
cacy of effective control over assets transferred to Pana-
manian, Honduran, etc., registry during the war had been
demonstrated, and since excessive subsidization to maintain
a large and competitive U.S. flag fleet was not economically
feasible in the post-war period, an effort was made to refine
the effective control concept to bring it in line with U.S.
defense needs.
In 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered the role
of U.S. merchant shipping as an instrument of national de-
fense as follows:
To be effective as an instrument of national defense
U.S. merchant shipping should be under U.S. flag or ef-
fective U.S. control and should be of such capacity that
it is able to absorb substantial initial losses which may
be occasioned by either a surprise attack or an efficient
submarine and air interdiction of sea lanes, or both, and
still perform the following services:
a. Provide logistic support for forces of the U.S.
which may be overseas at the time of the emergency.
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b. Transport U.S. forces to overseas destinations and
maintain such forces.
c. Maintain the economic war making capacity of the
country. (Emphasis added) [Ref. 96]
At the same time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also defined
effective U.S. control:
The teinn 'effective United States control' as applied to
shipping is considered to include all shipping which can be
expected to be available for requisition by the United
States Government in time of national emergency even though
such shipping may not be under the United States flag.
When ships earmarked for the National Defense pool are
chartered by agencies other than United States nationals,
agreements should be made to return these ships to United
States Government control if required for war or emergency
purposes. (J.C.S. 1454/1) [Ref. 97]
In 1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff expanded and clarified
that definition as follows:
The term 'effective United States control' as used in
J.C.S. 1454/1 appears to be inadequately defined. On a
number of occasions doubt as to the meaning of the term has
arisen. Except through agreement there are no legal means
by which the United States can regain control of a United
States merchant vessel the registry of which has been
transferred to another country. From a legal standpoint
therefore it can be considered that the only time a vessel
is under absolute 'effective United States control' is when
it flies the United States flag. Actually, however, there
are certain countries in this hemisphere which through dip-
lomatic or other arrangements will permit the transfer to
their registry of United States ships owned by United
States citizens or United States corporations to retain
control of these vessels. Prior to entry of the United
States into World War II, United States vessels were trans-
ferred to Panamanian registry for the purpose of rendering
aid to the allies. Such a case as the above can be con-
sidered to be within the meaning of the term 'effective
United States control'. When the foreign authorities who
are in a position to dictate to the owner, master, crew,
charterer or other individual or agency having physical
control of the vessel are willing and able to bring the
vessel under control of the United States in an emergency
for such use as the United States may wish to make of the
vessel, such vessel may also be considered to be under
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'effective United States control'. It can be concluded,
therefore, that the primary considerations in determining
whether or not a United States merchant ship registered
under a foreign flag would still be under 'effective United
States control' are:
a. The practice followed in the past in regard to trans-
fer of United States merchant vessels to foreign
registry.
b. The status of diplomatic relations between the United
States and the foreign country concerned.
c. Its relations with countries opposed to our system
of government or foreign policy.
d. Proximity of the foreign country to the United States.
e. The stability of its government. (J.C.S. 1454/11)
[Ref. 98]
Two other governmental initiatives structured the
relationship of the government maintained fleet and the U.S.
flag fleet to defense requirements. As an adjunct to the
carrying capacity of regular Navy ships, a fleet of govern-
ment owned ships in the technical custody of the Navy but
predominantely crewed by civilians in the employ of the gov-
ernment was set up. This fleet was designated the "nucleus
fleet," and was set up to be administered by the Military
Sea Transport Service (Military Sealift Command since 1970)
which was established in 1947. The functions of the Military
Sealift Command will be considered in greater depth in Chap-
ter III.
In 1954, the size of the nucleus fleet was limited by
agreement between the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce
(Wilson-Weeks agreement) to no more than fifty-six transports,
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thirty-four cargo ships, and sixty-one tankers unless under
conditions of full mobilization [Ref . 99] . Less than two
months later, the Cargo Preference Act of 1954 was signed
into law [Ref. 100] . Covering three classes of goods: goods
bought by the government for its own account? goods provided
by the government for the account of another nation, if not
paid for by that nation; and goods for which the government
had advanced funds
,
granted credits , or guaranteed the con-
vertibility of foreign currencies, fifty percent of such
shipments, by gross tonnage, moved by sea must be carried by
privately owned U.S. flag vessels if available [Ref. 101].
Although a 190 4 law required that all military ship-
ments be carried by ships of U.S. registry or maintained by
the U.S. government, the Cargo Preference Act of 1954 placed
the additional requirement that at least fifty percent of
military cargoes must be carried by privately owned U.S. flag
ships. This provision effectively took the government out of
direct competition with private lines, and provided a stimu-
lus to the size of the U.S. flag fleet. Thus together with
mothballed assets, the commercial U.S. flag fleet, the gov-
ernment maintained fleet, and the effective U.S. control
fleet make up the backbone of shipping capacity on which the
United States must rely in a crisis situation.
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H. THE GENESIS OF LIBERIAN REGISTRY"'"^
As the United States divested itself of the great excess
in shipping created during the Second World War, registry in
countries where maritime legislation proved convenient to the
shipowner increased greatly. Such was the case in Panama,
where the maritime code had evolved over time specifically to
attract foreign shipping. Of the ships sold under the Mer-
chant Ship Sales Act of 1946, 152, predominantly U.S. tank-
ers, were registered in Panama, increasing the total
Panamanian flag fleet from 268 ships in 1945 to 406 in 1946
[Ref . 102] . By 1948 the Panamanian registry system had
reached over 3 million tons and 515 ships [Ref. 103] .. With
this increase, however, had come a corrupting influence both
in the consular system of collecting fees and the administra-
tion of the registry system in general.
Along with the growing problems associated with registry
under Panctma's "flag of convenience" were two other rapidly
developing areas of concern. First, with resumption of sub-
sidies under the Merchant Marine Act of 19 36 that had been
set aside during the war years, the advantages of registry to
avoid U.S. maritime legislation and labor restrictions were
again evident. Though merchant crews with national ties to
the Axis Powers had been successfully removed from Allied
The entirety of this section is based substantially on




owned ships prior to and during the Second World War (thus
creating an increased labor market for American seamen) , this
trend had reversed in the years following the war causing
great concern in American seamen's unions. Second, growing
antagonism on the part of the Panamanian population and lea-
dership against colonial aspects of the position of the
United States in Panama called into question the reliability
of the dependency relationship which had given shipowners
all the advantages of U.S. protection and legal backing while
sailing under the flag of Panama.
At this same time Edward R. Stettinius , Jr., former Sec-
retary of State under Franklin D. Roosevelt, was aware of the
commercial prospects for the African nation of Liberia.
Situated on the west coast of Africa, Liberia had ties with
the United States equally as strong as Panama's. "Founded in
182 2 by black American settlers financed by the American
Colonial Society, Liberia had grown from a string of isolated
colonies of liberated American slaves and freemen into a self-
governing commonwealth by 1339. In 1847, the commonwealth
declared its independence and became the first republic in
Africa" [Ref. 104]. In 1944 the President, W.V.S. Tubman,
had been elected on an "open door" platform promising re-
cruitment of foreign investment, thus opening the door for





Unlike Panama, Liberia had a modest maritime tradition
in the mid-nineteenth century, her fleet reaching 300 sailing
ships, mostly of local design, construction and ownership
[Ref. 106]. By 1900 this coastal fleet had been made nearly
extinct by foreign competition and the advent of steam power.
Though Stettinius was primarily interested in a profit-
sharing arrangement based on the exportation of iron ore , he
was quick to see the potential for developing a shipping
registry system to rival that of Panama. In his former
position, he recognized the strategic position of Liberia,
which was built up as a jumping-off point for U.S. forces
during World War II. The port of Monrovia, improved during
the war by the U.S. Navy, would provide an excellent port
for the transport of iron ore. Having tanker ships already
registered in Panama, Stettinius was also well aware of the
problems developing in that country.
The result of this combination of situations and oppor-
tunities led to the creation of a maritime code tailor-made
for and approved by many of the larger proprietary shipping
lines. Since the subsidies associated with the Merchant
Marine Act of 1936 did not apply to tankers, either inde-
pendently operated or part of a company owned line, the con-
venience built into the Liberian maritime code were particu-
larly appealing to the larger oil companies that were not
completely satisfied with Panamanian registry.
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The Stettinius group drafted, between April and July of
1948, a corporation code for Liberia. By 21 July of that
year the maritime code was drafted [Ref . 107] . Delays in
implementation came about while the draft law was cleared
with the major oil companies. An attempt was also made to
achieve the approval of the U.S. Department of State on the
proposed legislation. Personality conflicts and a change of
administration prevented ready acceptance by State, and the
draft degislation was forwarded with minor changes for action
by the government of Liberia. The Liberian legislature
passed the requested maritime code with minor changes in
November, 1948, and it was signed into law in December of
the same year [Ref. 108] . The improved aspects of Liberian
registry and the Liberian maritime code, including the trans-
fer of and initiation of registry through the International
Trust Company office in New York rather than a consular net-
work, set in motion a rapid movement by shipowners to the
flag of Liberia. By 1955, in reality only seven years after
passage of its maritime legislation, Liberia surpassed Panama
in total tonnage registered [Ref. 109]. By 1956, Liberia
also passed Panama in number of ships registered. Today,
Liberia ranks number one in the world in terms of ships and




I. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S. MARITIME POLICY
1. U.S. Policy in Context
Since World War II, there has not been a national
emergency which required the requisitioning of U.S. effective
control vessels or, for that matter, American flag vessels
[Ref . Ill] . During the Korean conflict, as well as during
the American involvement in Vietnam, U.S. flag and effective
control vessels were both made available for use by their
corporate ownership on a voluntary basis.
Several events of historical importance have shaped
the composition and characteristics of the maritime assets of
the United States. On July 19, 1956, John Foster Dulles an-
nounced the retraction of the loan offer to Egypt for con-
struction of the Aswan Dam which prompted Nasser to announce
nationalization of the Suez Canal Company and seizure of the
Canal a week later [Ref. 112], In 1967, during the Arab-
Israeli conflict, the Canal was closed. In both cases, the
potential for disruption of oil resources caused a diversi-
fication by both European nations and the United States in
access to required oil as well as construction of larger
tankships capable of rounding the Cape of Good Hope to main-
tain the flow of oil. The Suez crisis came at a time when
ships constructed during World War II were nearing obsoles-
cence and produced a natural transition to larger assets.
Many of those assets were subsequently registered under flags
of convenience in Liberia and Panama.
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Modern economies are now tied inextricably to the
availability of energy resources. Oil, unlike most other
energy resources, can be easily transported, stored, and
utilized commensurate with need. Oil today accounts for
over half of world seaborne trade [Ref . 113] . For other
than transportation of oil from Alaska's north slope, which
is required by law to be carried by the American flag fleet,
the United States relies almost exclusively on the effective
control fleet for delivery of this vital resource. These
same ships will play a key role should the United States be-
come involved in a conflict situation, limited or otherwise.
As stated by Admiral James L. Holloway III, Chief of
Naval Operations, in his policy statement of 1 March, 1978:
The United States has plans for the utilization of foreign
flag ships of the Effective U.S. Control (EUSC) Fleet.
These are U.S. -owned or U.S. controlled ships of foreign
registry of 1,000 gross tons or more, which are under con-
tract to the Maritime Administration. These can reasonably
be expected to be made available for U.S. use in time of
emergency. [Ref. 114]
At no time during World War II, the Korean conflict, or at
any time during the Vietnamese conflict did U.S. effective
control vessels refuse to sail [Ref. 115]. This was the case
even when Section 902 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as
amended, was not utilized to effect requisition. Through
careful administration of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936,
with few significant changes to the Act, United States mari-
time policy has progressed in such a way that both the eco-
nomic and defense needs for a strong merchant marine have
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Ibeen met. Though there are deficiencies in some areas, such
as dry bulk carriers, more ships have been available since
World War II than needed to meet both military and commercial
requirements. Given current initiatives and market trends,
there is no reason to believe that this situation will change
appreciably in the near term.
2 . Structuring Maritime Policy—The Last Decade
In 1969, the Maritime Administration proposed to
congress a major ship construction program to modernize the
U.S. merchant marine. The program, to be aided by construc-
tion differential subsidies called for 300 vessels to be
built over a ten-year period [Ref . 116] . As vessels built
near the end of World War II and during the mid-1960s were
approaching block obsolescence, the program was designed to
modernize in all areas of shipping, but primarily in the pro-
duction of bulk carriers in that U.S. exports and imports
were growing fastest and U.S. flag participation in bulk
trades was the lowest [Ref. 117]
.
Accompanying this construction program was a revision
of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 passed by Congress in
1970 [Ref. 118] . This revision was in no way a significant
departure from the original Act and served only to update it
as necessary to recognize the realities of the 1970s. Thus
American maritime policy has remained remarkably constant
for over fifty years and should serve the nation's needs well
during the next decade without a great deal of modification.
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3. Emergency Requisition of Foreign Vessels
In 1979, the Emergency Foreign Vessel Acquisition Act
was passed by Congress. Pursuant to Section 902 of the Mer-
chant Marine Act of 1936 as amended by 46 U.S. Code Section
1242 to establish Presidential authority to requisition ships
owned by U.S. citizens, the Act extends Presidential authori-
ty as indicated below:
SECTION 196. Emergency foreign vessel acquisition;
purchase or requisition of vessels lying idle in United
States waters
During any period in which vessels may be requisitioned
under section 1242 of Title 46, the President is authorized
and empowered through the Secretary of Commerce to purchase,
or to requisition, or for any part of such period to char-
ter or requisition the use of, or to take over the title to
or possession of, for such use or disposition as he shall
direct, any merchant vessel not owned by citizens of the
United States which is lying idle in waters within the
jurisdiction of the United States and which the President
finds to be necessary to the national defense. [Ref. 119]
This Act, extending the right of angory described earlier to
situations in which the United States has not declared war,
is an established precedent in international law. Not
since French and Dutch ships were seized during World War II
has this right been exercised by the United States. In those
cases, because of German occupation, original crews were re-
tained on requisitioned foreign vessels in most cases. To
date, the Act passed in 1979 has not been utilized under
Legislative history of the Emergency Foreign Vessel
Acquisition Act was provided by Mr. Thomas X. Schiff, Legal




Presidential authority, and, therefore, no assessment of the
response by other nations in the international community is
possible.
4. Maritime Policy in Retrospect
The evolution of U.S. maritime policy can be seen as
not too different from that of other nations. Because of a
lack of comparative advantage in ship construction and labor
costs, the ability to make use of the convenient aspects of
foreign registry has not been prohibited. This has, unfor-
tunately, placed American seamen who so courageously have
served the United States in World War II and every conflict
subsequently, in a position of competition with foreign sea-
men who will accept lower wages for jobs. The alternative,
however, is a direct subsidization for them and the ship-
building industry by the government. Replacement value alone
of the ships of the effective control fleet would be over 40
billion dollars if built in U.S. shipyards [Ref . 120] . The
cost of providing this same fleet, if registered under the
U.S. flag, with operating subsidies would be at least 900
million dollars each year [Ref. 121]. Therefore, through
economic practicality, the United States has found a balance
between social justice and commercial necessity as well as
between military requirement and military contingency.
Though the effective control concept may be well
suited to American economic and defense needs , it has often




advantage as well as seafarers' unions claiming unfair labor
practices. The next chapter will give some brief insights
into how the assault on flags of convenience has been con-
ducted, and of the results of those assaults.
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III. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND REGISTRY UNDER FOREIGN FLAGS
A. FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE OR FLAGS OF NECESSITY?"*"^
In the years immediately following World War II, the need
for increased shipping capacity for the reconstruction of the
European economy was immense . Governmental regulations and
laws governing taxation of shipping profits in the United
States, however, remained basically the same as prior to the
outbreak of hostilities. Had the alternative of ship regis-
tration in Panama, Honduras, and Costa Rica not been availa-
ble to shipowners, the result would undoubtedly have been
higher transportation costs borne by the public through com-
modity price increases or subsidies. In times of necessity
for additional shipping capacity, registration under flags of
convenience provided an economic stimulus . Because the ad-
vantages available to shipowners with vessels registered
under their same nationality through government relief and
assistance were not available to other shipowners , register-
ing vessels under foreign flags was, particularly during re-
cessions, an economically viable recourse. Without an
operating differential to cover potential losses, shipping
12Arguments and discussions in this section are based al-
most exclusively on material presented in two excellent texts
on the legal questions associated with registry under flags
of convenience: Erling D. Ness, The Great PanLibHon Contro-
versy , and Boleslaw A. Boczek, Flags of Convenience; An
International Legal Study .
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registered abroad to increase profitability operated more
on the margin than that protected through governmental
subsidization.
After the war the United States was not the only nation
in a position where foreign registry was an incentive, or in
fact a requisite for continuation of a strong merchant ma-
rine. Greek shipowners, threatened by the possibility of a
Communist takeover of their government (as well as facing
crippling taxation and regulation) , saw foreign registry as
both a refuge and an economic necessity [Ref . 122] . Maritime
interests in other nations, for a variety of reasons, also
became aware of and took advantage of Panamanian and other
flags of convenience.
While legislation prevented the development of a merchant
marine of optimum size in the United States after World War
II, American reliance on foreign resources, and particularly
oil, was increasing rapidly. After the war the United States,
through its major oil companies, was the largest developer of
foreign oil. Foreign subsidiaries of domestic companies also
made them significant stockholders in oil production facili-
ties throughout the world. To protect this interest, a large
tankship capacity was necessary. Unable to support required
development of this capacity under the U.S. flag for economic
reasons, the alternative was to support investment by U.S.
citizens in ships to be registered abroad. This registration
could be either in: (1) nations with a strong maritime
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tradition (which would necessitate a greater cost to the
American consumer as well as the loss of assets to foreign
requisition in the event of war) ; or (2) a nation offering a
convenient maritime code whereby profits would be taxed at a
low rate or not at all and would be subject to domestic taxa-
tion only when repatriated to the United States. Since re-
sources could not be transported competitively under the U.S.
flag, registry in Panama and later Liberia was a logical and
acceptable alternative, from both an economic and govern-
mental policy standpoint.
Another reason for the growth of flags of convenience
after the Second World War was the availability of capital
for ship construction. At that time, the United States was
the only major nation of the world in a position to provide
construction funding. Lending institutions, however, were
reluctant to make capital available for ships that were to be
registered in Europe where profits were subject to relatively
high rates of taxation [Ref . 123]
.
European nations, in competition with PANLIBHON registry
systems, saw the flight of vessels of U.S. ownership to these
flags as unfair competition. British legislation prohibited
citizens from registry under standard flags of convenience,
but a similar situation for taxation and repatriation of pro-
fits was allowed through registration in Bermuda, a British
Crown Colony. The British position, much the same as that
of Norway and other large European maritime nations, was that
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the United States should rely on foreign shipping rather
than flags of convenience in both times of peace and war.
Rather than face loss of control of shipping in time of
war or lose a large share of the international transportation
industry to Europe resulting in higher domestic shipping
costs, the United States was forced to support PANLIBHON
registry. The alternative, economically and militarily, was
unacceptable.
B. INITIAL ASSAULTS ON FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE
1. Points of Contention
It was not until the disposal of the excess govern-
ment shipping capacity built up during World War II that
flags of convenience developed to the extent that they were
a serious threat to the flags of established maritime na-
tions. Prior to that time, hostility against flags providing
a haven for shipowners was confined mainly to the labor force
that this type of registration affected adversely. Of pri-
mary concern to seamen in nations where a large percentage of
shipowners registered their ships abroad was the displacement
of jobs that would otherwise have been secured by national
legislation (La Follette Seamen's Act of 1915, Section 13).
This, of course, was seen as advantageous by individuals from
other nations willing to accept the same jobs for lower
wages, and to their national leadership because of the re-
sultant decrease in unemployment. Of secondary, but still
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great concern, was the lack of specifications in many cases
for ship construction, habitability, inspection and safety
under the maritime codes and enforcement practices.
Ship construction to meet specifications is conducted
under the approval of a classification society, usually
either Lloyd's Register of London or the American Bureau of
Shipping, and with the supervision of their surveyors [Ref.
124] . Additionally, ships must be recertified every four
years to retain their class [Ref. 125]. This being the case,
construction practices of shipping registered under all the
flags of the world are pretty uniform. Similarly, ships
classed by Lloyd's or the American Bureau of Shipping are
required to comply with the standards they set for strength,
efficiency, loading and protection of openings above deck
and in the superstructure [Ref. 126]. As a result the same
safety standards apply to Panamanian, Liberian, etc., ship-
ping as to the rest of the world's shipping.
When regulations setting standards for habitability
,
wages and messing are not imposed by law, savings can be made
in the shipping industry by reducing standards to what the
labor market will bear. Other than exemption from taxation,
this condition is the most significant in making flags of
convenience attractive. Arguably, however, this not only
affects those who are forced to compete with foreign labor
more likely to find marginal conditions acceptable. More
importantly, it also decreases the leverage of labor
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organizations in nations with protective legislation in that
shipowners have the recourse of registration under flags of
convenience.
2 . Organizing the Opposition
Two distinct areas of opposition coalesced against
flags of convenience after the war. The first included sea-
men's unions concerned about "allegedly lower labor stan-
dards" and the loss of job opportunities, particularly for
U.S. seamen, resulting from foreign flag registration [Ref.
127] . The second was composed of the shipowners of tradi-
tional maritime nations. This group, including United States
flag shipowners, was supported for the most part by their
national governments and found that competition operating
under virtual tax-free flags seriously threatened their
operations [Ref. 128]
.
The first concerted effort to organize against flags
of convenience took place in 1947 when consideration of prob-
lems associated with this type of registry was given by the
Joint Maritime Commission of the International Labor Organi-
zation at the request of the International Transport Workers
'
Federation (ITF) [Ref. 129]. The result was, as declared by
the ITF Congress which met in Oslo, Norway on 21 July 1948,
that an international boycott of Panamanian and Honduran
ships would be put into effect at some unstipulated future
date by seafarers and dockworkers [Ref. 130], Through 1950,
the main emphasis of the ITF was on safety, crew competency
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and shipboard conditions. At this point a new objective
emerged, that being on obtaining collective agreements on
wages and working conditions [Ref . 131] . No worldwide boy-
cott action was taken to press for these goals for some time.
Rather, between September of 1952 and December of 1957 iso-
lated boycott action was taken against 23 separate ships
[Ref. 132].
In 1958, when opposition to flags of convenience was
reaching a peak, the two most powerful American maritime
unions, the National Maritime Union (NMU) and the Seafarers'
International Union (SIU) formed a coalition to oppose this
type of registry [Ref. 133] . To counter this alliance, a
number of the leaders in the maritime industry formed the
Committee for Flags of Necessity on 7 November, 1958, with
the avowed purpose of providing legal opposition to any ac-
tions by the unions directed against their interests [Ref.
134]. The position of the Committee was that, since tankers,
ore ships and dry cargo tramps were not eligible for the
government operating differential subsidy, they were forced
to operate their vessels under foreign flags to remain com-
petitive or be forced out of the shipping business. Their
ships were operated on a standard of excellence comparable to
that of the major European maritime nations, and they saw any
move to regulate employment contracts through collective




In late 1958, the Fair Practices Coiranittee of the ITF
met and scheduled an international boycott against flag of
convenience shipping for 1 to 4 December of the same year
[Ref . 135] . One week before the boycott was to begin the
American Committee initiated legal action to stop action of
the type likely to be employed against members' ships. The
unions countered by arguing that they were engaged in a labor
dispute within the context of the Norris-La Guardia Act,
which prohibited granting of injunctive relief by the Federal
Courts [Ref. 136]. The judgment was rendered in favor of
the unions, the Court thus determining that it had no juris-
diction and that the dispute, under provisions of Norris-La
Guardia, came within the perview of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board [Ref. 137]. Thus, the worldwide boycott went
into effect on 1 December and was conducted as planned.
The effect of the boycott was less dramatic than
originally planned. Although 125 ships were affected in the
United States only 8 in Canada and 30 in Europe and the rest
of the world were singled out for action [Ref. 138] . The
attacks were directed almost exclusively at American owned
shipping. No attacks on Bermudan registry against British
owned vessels were noted. The obvious intent of the inter-
national action was to compel American owners to abandon
PANLIBHONCO registries or, in lieu of that, to place them in
a position where they would have to acquiesce to have American




This arrangement, however, would have had serious negative
consequences for foreign seafarers, unions and governments.
By raising PANLIBHONCO wage rates and habitability standards
to U.S. levels, foreign seamen would be displaced as American
seamen entered the labor market. Representation by American
unions would negate bargaining power as well as agreements
already in effect as negotiated by foreign unions. Foreign
earnings repatriated by seamen would be displaced as American
seamen entered the labor market thus raising unemployment and
adversely affecting balance of payments in several countries.
In almost every instance , the gains made by American unions
would result in direct losses in other areas of the world.
Although shipowners in such nations as Britain and Norway
strongly opposed convenience registry from a competitive
standpoint, they also stood to lose from gains by organized
labor. For these reasons, lack of cohesion made the inter-
national boycott far less effective than originally intended.
As a result of the failure to accomplish an interna-
tional demonstration of solidarity, the ITF, led by the two
major U.S. unions (NMU and SIU) changed its plan of attack.
In January of 1959 it was mutually agreed by the Seafarers'
Section of the ITF that jurisdiction for organization of
crews would from that time forward be on the basis of the
nationalities of the owners of the ships concerned rather
than that of the crews [Ref . 140] . This would have affected
even ships of U.S. registry as portions of the crews which
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had been recruited in foreign ports, rather than receiving
compensation in line with that of the nation in which they
signed on, would receive standard rates which were invariably
higher. This would have placed American owned shipping at a
disadvantage in relation to virtually every other nation in
the world. As a result, Mr. Clarance G. Morse, Chairman of
the Federal Maritime Board, was prompted to state that pro-
posed action by the ITF was "a major threat to the United
States' mobilization plans" [Ref. 141]. Though the intent
of the ITF was to raise the overall wage scales of seamen on
an international basis, the intent of the American Unions
was obviously to supplant foreign crews with U.S. crews.
This caused a basis for contention which would ultimately
cause the demise of the concerted union action,
Greek unions, as well as Greek shipowners who were
often financed with U.S. capital, were perfectly happy with
the contractual arrangements they had in effect. U.S. inter-
ference would only be detrimental to their own interests. In
choosing vessels to be picketed in support of union objec-
tives, the American unions often picked unwisely and injected
themselves into foreign controlled situations. The resulting
confrontations, as well as legal pressure brought by the
American Committee and individual shipowners singled out for
boycott, proved too fragmentary and too expensive for con-
tinued action. Even the essence of negotiated treaties pro-
hibiting attempts by one nation to impose labor regulation
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on ships of another nation entering territorial waters was
called into question. The result was a rejection by the ITF
of SIU attempts to exercise control over labor matters under
the jurisdiction of a foreign labor organization and a split
between the SIU and NMU. Although the National Labor Rela-
tions Board had noted in 1961 that it would exercise juris-
diction over PANLIBHON shipping if "grouping of contracts"
substantiated a reasonable basis for such action, by the end
of the year internationally orchestrated labor attacks on
convenience registry were on the decline [Ref . 142] . The
NMU was forced to adopt a course of action which could be
pursued independently by the American unions, that being to
require U.S. flag shipowners contracting with American unions
to accept contracts for both their U.S. vessels and PANLIBHON
ships of their ownership with the same contractual stipula-
tions [Ref. 143] . The SIU also adopted this position.
Though a large number of ships would potentially fall under
the edict of the American unions , the outcome was by no
, 13
means clear.
Throughout the legal assault on flags of convenience
one well-established aspect of international law remained in
effect, that a vessel is subject exclusively to the law of
the State of its registry and whose flag it flies [Ref. 144].
International treaties entered into by the United States
Discussion based on Chapters 6 and 7 of The Great
PanLibHon Controversy by Erling D. Naess.
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reaffirmed this principle. As legal actions against selec-
tive boycotts against individual ships by the American unions
proceeded through appellate review, not only the nations
directly under attack for their maritime practices but also
such established maritime nations as Britain began to realize
that their own interests would be jeopardized if the U.S.
court system elected to retain jurisdiction over foreign
merchant seamen for the National Labor Relations Board. The
Board had adopted the approach that elections would be per-
mitted aboard foreign flag vessels to determine their desire
to be represented by American unions. Although the only
elections held soundly rejected union representation, legal
action was forthcoming from foreign unions whose jurisdiction
had thereby been infringed upon [Ref . 145]
.
The culmination of the legal assault came on 18
February, 1963, when the Supreme Court ruled that the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board was barred from exercising
jurisdiction over "foreign-flag ships employing alien sea-
men" [Ref. 146]. Coupled with the fragmentation of unity
internationally and between the major American unions, this
setback eliminated for all practical purposes the most sig-




C. INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY FOR FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE
In 1956, the International Law Commission adopted an
article (Article 29) which stated that "Each State shall fix
the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for
the registration of ships in its territory and for the right
to fly its flag. Ships have the nationality of the State
whose flag they are entitled to fly" [Ref . 147] . Previous
to that/ in 1948, the United Nations Maritime Conference had
established the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative
Organization (IMCO) [Ref. 148] . This body, while planned in
1948, didn't come into effect until March, 1958, when rati-
fication of the IMCO Treaty by the required twenty-one States
originally stipulated was completed [Ref. 149]. Article 28
of the IMCO convention stipulated that:
(a) The Maritime Safety Committee shall consist of
fourteen Members elected by the Assembly from the Members,
governments of those nations having an important interest
in maritime safety, of which not less than eight shall be
the largest shipowning nations, and the remainder shall be
elected so as to ensure adequate representation of Members,
governments of other nations with an important interest in
maritime safety, such as nations interested in the supply
of large numbers of crews or in the carriage of large
numbers of berthed and unberthed passengers, and of major
geographical areas. [Ref. 150]
At the time, in terms of tonnage, Liberia ranked third and
Panama eighth of all the maritime flags of the world [Ref.
151].
The question of "genuine link" again arose with the pos-
sibility of recognition of States associated with flags of
convenience in an important international body. The
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established maritime nations of Europe attempted to block
Panamanian and Liberian inclusion on the Safety Committee
because to include them would offer official recognition of
legitimacy of status as well as give them significant influ-
ence on maritime matters which the established nations wished
to withhold. Even with U.S. backing, neither Panama or Li-
beria was elected to membership in the Committee.
After the election had taken place, a resolution by the
Liberian delegation requesting that Article 28 be submitted
to the International Court of Justice at the Hague for inter-
pretation was approved.
The International Court spent almost a year in research
and deliberations. On 3 June 1960 the Advisory Opinion was
delivered. It was a victory for the Flags of Convenience
nations. The Opinion read:
Where Article 28(a) of the 1948 IMCO Convention (refer-
ring to the membership of the Maritime Safety Committee)
refers to SHIPOWNING NATIONS, the reference is solely to
registered tonnage.
The Assembly of IMCO, in not electing Liberia and Panama
to the Maritime Safety Committee on 15 January 1959, did
NOT exercise its electoral power in a manner in accor-
dance with Article 28(a) of the IMCO Convention of 1948.
Therefore, it was NOT correct in 1959 to exclude Liberia
and Panama from the group consisting of 'not less than
eight' of 'the largest shipowning nations'.
Neither the nationality of stockholders of shipping com-
panies, nor the 'notion of a genuine link' between the
ships and their country of registry is a relevant test
for determining ' shipowning nations '
.
The underlying principle of Article 28 (a) is that the





A general opinion, shared by the Court, is that it is
not possible to contend that the words ' shipowning na-
tions ' means that the ships have to be owned by the
States itself.
Either the words refer to tonnage beneficially owned by
nationals of a State or to registered tonnage of a flag
State regardless of private or State ownership.
Of the fourteen Judges, nine endorsed the above opinion.
Three of the Judges dissented without submitting any opin-
ion. Only two of the Judges submitted dissenting opinions.
[Ref. 152]
With this decision, the flags of Panama, Liberia, and
other nations offering convenient maritime codes was firmly
established in international law.
D. EFFECTIVE CONTROL REAFFIRMED FOR THE AMERICAN OWNED
TANKER FLEET
A boom in tanker freight experienced in 1956 and 19 57 was
followed by a huge slump in 1958, 1959 and 1960 [Ref. 153].
During the boom period, speculation on tanker ships by Ameri-
can investors was heavy. This was due in part to the
availability, beginning in 1956, of U.S. Government Mortgage
Insurance for up to 100 percent of the unpaid balance and
interest on a Preferred Ship Mortgage provided the mortgage
did not exceed 87.5 percent of the total cost of the vessel,
under Title 11 of the Merchant Marine Act as amended in 1956
[Ref. 154].
Another factor was the so-called 'Trade-out and Build'
programme. Under this programme, the Maritime Administra-
tion permitted the transfer to foreign registry of old
tonnage, in return for a commitment to build new, American
tonnage. Because a vessel under one of the PanLibHon flags
(which were the only flags to which the Maritime Adminis-
tration approved transfers) commanded a substantially
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higher market value than an American-flag vessel, the
•right' to transfer a vessel to such foreign flag commanded
a substantial premium. In the autumn of 1956, the peak
period of the Suez Canal closing, such premium amounted to
as high as $1 million for the right to transfer a T2 tanker,
[Ref. 155]
The resulting speculation in the tanker industry caused
a group of American tanker owners to petition in 1960 for
legislation requiring that a large portion of oil imports be
required to be transported in bottoms of U.S. registry. This
was clearly in violation of Article XI of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which outlawed trade re-
strictions between contracting parties [Ref. 156].
The result of the consideration given this proposal was
a strong affirmation of the system of foreign flag registry
developed since World War II. The government of the United
States maintained the position that U.S. defense needs were
in fact satisfied through the effective control concept. It
was also determined that restrictions on trade or excessive
subsidization was not a viable alternative to Panamanian and
Liberian registry,
E. THE ESTABLISHED SYSTEM
Since the early 1960s, neither the concept of effective
control nor registration under flags of convenience has been
significantly challenged. The Soviet Union, primarily to
attack a system giving advantage to the United States , has
spearheaded a movement aimed at phasing out flags of conve-
nience at the United Nations Conference on Trade and
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Development (UNCTAD) . This effort, however, seems doomed to
defeat. The open registry system is confirmed in interna-
tional law and supported by too many nations besides the
United States to be seriously challenged.
Americans today control about 30% of open registry tonnage,
followed by Hong Kong owners, who are British subjects,
with 20%, Greek owners with 13%, Japanese owners with 11%
and German owners with 3%. Other European nationalities,
such as Norwegian and British, are joining the ranks of
open registry owners in increasing numbers. Even the
Peoples Republic of China has open registry tonnage under
its control. [Ref. 157]
The advantages of open registry to the United States are
numerous. A few examples bring this point to bear:
In January 1981 the U.S. flag vessel PRESIDENT CLEVELAND
was fixed to carry 20,000 tons of wheat from the Columbia
River to Egypt at a rate of $139.82 per ton. During the
same week the Liberian flag vessel FAUSTINA was fixed to
transport 23,500 tons of wheat between the same ports at a
rate of $52.75 per ton. The probable added cost for the
U.S. vessel: $1,741,400.
In July, 1981 the U.S. flag vessel BULK TRANSPORTER was
fixed to carry 15,500 tons of wheat from the U.S. Gulf to
Zaire at a rate of $147.75 a ton, while the Liberian flag
vessel ORIENT HORIZON was fixed to carry 12,000 tons of
wheat in the same trade at the rate of $58.50 a ton. The
probable added cost for the U.S. flag vessel: $1,383,375.
In February 1982 the U.S. flag vessel POTOMAC was fixed to
carry 22,000 tons of wheat from the North Pacific to Egypt
at a rate of $112.10 per ton. During the same week the
Greek vessel COMMON VENTURE was fixed to carry 25,000 tons
of wheat in the same trade for $30.01 a ton. The probable
added cost for the U.S. flag vessel: $1,805,980. [Ref.
158]
Employment costs account for a significant portion of the
higher cost of transportation aboard U.S. flag vessels.
The total employment cost of a 32-man Italian crew is ap-
proximately $1.3 million per year. There are also a number
of Spanish-manned vessels whose payroll cost is in the area
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of $1.05 million per year for a 32-man crew. In contrast,
an equivalent American crew results in total payroll costs
(including the wage increases effective June 15, 1981), of
about $3 million per year. [Ref. 159]
The result of effective control is therefore not only a
realistic means of meeting U.S. defense needs, but also a
means of ensuring the availability of a commercially viable
merchant marine to meet the economic needs of the country.
Although there are certainly deficiencies that can be identi-
fied, such as the loss of access to jobs offering adequate
wages by U.S. merchant seamen, the alternatives are even less
attractive. Either the United States must accept the effec-
tive control concept, revise domestic maritime policy along
the lines of the open registry systems, or build and subsi-
dize an American flag fleet at considerable loss to the
American taxpayer and consumer. Clearly, effective control
is the best answer. Additionally, as will be explained in a
subsequent chapter, it affords the United States certain
benefits in both the economic and military sense that a
purely U.S. flag merchant fleet could not. Effective control
is well established in international law, is here to stay,
and is of immense value to the United States.
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IV. UNITED STATES OIL TRANSPORTATION CAPACITY
A. INTRODUCTION
Development of U.S. maritime policy, and the status of
certain features of that policy in international law, is of
particular importance with regard to the structure of the
merchant marine. As was mentioned at the beginning of chap-
ter II, that structure includes the following categories of
shipping assets:
1. Shipping controlled directly by the Military Sealift
Command (MSC) and operated entirely to support military
operations.
2. Shipping of the United States national fleet, and as
such under direct U.S. control and of U.S. registry.
3. Shipping of the "effective-control fleet" of the United
States which is owned in whole or in part by U.S. citi-
zens but, for a variety of reasons, has been registered
under a foreign flag.
This chapter will discuss, in detail, each of the above types
of assets. A quantitative assessment of the capacity of each
to transport various types of petroleum products will also be
made.
B. NATIONAL MARITIME CAPACITY
Today, the United States flag merchant marine carries
only about five percent of the import and export tonnage of
this country [Ref . 160] . The United States compares quite
poorly with the United Kingdom, which carries 34 percent of
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its foreign trade; West Germany 20 percent; Noirway 30 per-
cent; Japan 44 percent; and the Soviet Union 55 percent [Ref.
161] . Such a situation exists also at a time when the United
States is dependent on foreign sources for between 50 and 100
percent of the supply of virtually all of the 70-odd raw
materials listed by the Department of Defense as essential to
the economy and for the military preparedness of the United
States [Ref. 162]
.
The United States has also averaged importation of nearly
eight million barrels of oil per day since 1977. Since 1980,
however, this level has fallen dramatically to 5,874,000 in
1981. More than half of this critical resource is carried
by vessels of the effective fleet [Ref. 163]. Where in 1970,
Canada and Venezuela accounted for 70 percent of the U.S.
crude oil imports, today those two countries supply only
about 11.5 percent [Ref. 164]. By far the majority of oil
today is supplied by the Arab OPEC states. Actual import of
petroleum products will be provided for 1981 in a table
later in this chapter. It is easy to see that, as areas of
supply shift to Southwest Asia, transportation distances in-
crease. With these increases in distance come significant
increases in the vulnerability of U.S. ability to transport
oil.
As Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Thomas Hayward,
stated in early 1982: "Without adequate and reliable sea-
lift, literally none of our military plans are executable" at
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a time when more than 90 percent of all wartime cargo will
be transported by sea, no matter where the conflict takes
place [Ref . 165]
.
During the Korean War, an average of 400 dry cargo
ships were employed to sustain the deployment, representing
17 percent of total U.S. assets. At that time, 2,400 dry
cargo ships were available from the National Defense Re-
serve Fleet, U.S. Flag fleet and MSC controlled fleet.
In Vietnam during the peak sealift year of 1968, the
MSC controlled fleet averaged 420 ships, or 36 percent of
U.S. total assets.
If a similar contingency occurred today in Korea re-
quiring a sealift comparable to the Korean or Vietnam con-
flict, about 350 dry cargo ships would be needed . . . and
that would represent 75 percent of today's total available
resources. In Korea in 1953 the U.S. had more than 2,400
dry cargo ships. Today we can count on only about 430.
[Ref. 166]
The state of U.S. capacity to transport petroleum pro-
ducts is not nearly so grim, as will be shown in the analysis
that follows. There are, however, some areas where lack of
capacity could prove a problem in time of national crisis.
This will be addressed in the next section on the Military
Sealift Command.
C. STRUCTURE OF THE MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND •''^
The Military Sealift Command is the backbone of the de-
fense logistics capability of the United States. During
^
^Material for this section was provided by Mr. Jim Milas
of the Military Sealift Command, Washington, D.C., and Mr.
John Minna and Mr. Cary Muerle of the Military Sealift Com-
mand, N.S.C. Oakland, California. All information in the
section not otherwise documented was provided by them.
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times of normal peacetime operation, the MSC "nucleus fleet"
provides the bulk of services required by the uniformed
military.
With the exception of an undisclosed but probably small
volume of cargo that is carried in regular Navy ships, all
Defense Department cargoes that move by sea do so under
arrangements made by the Military Sealift Command, the
department's shipping agency. Although this command is a
unit of the Navy, and is staffed in part by Navy personnel,
its job is to furnish ocean transportation services to the
entire Department of Defense and occasionally other govern-
ment organizations. The command operates a fleet of
government-owned vessels, all of which are commissioned
vessels crewed by Navy officers and men. Most of this
fleet is manned by civilian crews in the employment of the
government. A smaller number of other government-owned
ships that have been assigned to the Military Sealift Com-
mand are operated for it by private contractors on a cost-
plus-fixed-fee basis. Together these ships compose the
command's "nucleus fleet."
The size of the nucleus fleet was limited in 1954 by
an agreement between the secretaries of defense and com-
merce, the so-called Wilson-Weeks agreement. Except under
conditions of full mobilization, the nucleus fleet must
not contain more than fifty-six transports, thirty-four
cargo ships, and sixty-one tankers.
The same agreement sets forth the order in which the
Defense Department may turn to other sources for shipping
space. First it must make as much use as possible of U.S.
liner service. If it needs more space, the department may
charter U.S. flag vessels from private owners. If still
more space is needed, the Maritime Administration may break
out vessels from the National Defense Reserve Fleet and put
them in service for the Defense Department. Only after
these sources have been exhausted may the department en-
gage space aboard foreign flag vessels. [Ref. 167]
To transport petroleum products, MSC currently maintains
a 30 ship tanker fleet. This fleet transports approximately
6.5 million barrels of refined products per month to and from
points all around the world. Although the entire MSC fleet
is controlled from Washington, 18 of its vessels are operated
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by private companies on long-term charters. The remaining
12 vessels are operated on short-term time charters (6
months - 10 years), and on spot charters. Table I indicates
the bulk petroleum traffic moved by MSC from FY 1972 to FY
1980 (FY 1976T refers to the transition period to a 1 October
fiscal year commencement date) . The two main companies cur-
rently operating MSC vessels on a contract basis are Trinidad
Corporation and Marine Transport Corporation (MATRA) lines.
Total petroleum shipments from 1952 to 1980 are provided as
broken down between government-owned and privately owned
(charter) vessels in Table II. Dry cargo shipments are also
provided in Table II.
Should MSC assets and assets chartered by the Military
Sealift Command prove inadequate to meet demand, additional
assets can be brought on line or made available. Figure 1
indicates the sequence in which this is accomplished.
The National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) , as late as
1966, included over 400 freighters of reasonable vintage. 111
ships configured for special military usage, 70 tankers, 57
passenger ships, 74 ocean tugs and 924 ships of marginal
utility [Ref . 168] . Today the mothballed NDRF has declined
to 170 ships, of which 129 are remnants of the original
Figure 1 is reprinted from p. 7 of the Memorandum of
Agreement Between the Department of Defense and the Depart-
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victory Ship fleet built during World War II and now aver-
aging over 40 years of age [Ref . 169] . The availability of
tanker ships to carry refined petroleum products is similarly
grim [Ref. 170] . On the average, from one to three NDRF
ships are brought out of mothballs yearly to augment other
MSC assets.
Should NDRF assets fall short of requirements, the Sea-
lift Readiness Program may be activated to acquire civil
shipping support for military operations. Under the program,
a Tanker Requirements Committee is convened and shipping
industry participants provide assets as allocated among them-
selves through the Voluntary Tanker Agreement [Ref. 171].
Only when the procedures outlined above still fall short
of military requirements can U.S. flag and effective U.S.
controlled (EUSC) ships be requisitioned through Section
902(a) of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. Since World War
II, this has not been necessary as assets have been made
available by shipo\^mers without the need for a declaration
of national emergency by the President.
If all other sources combined are inadequate to meet re-
quirements, the use of NATO ships remains as an option. Cur-
rently NATO European allies have earmarked some 600 vessels
specifically for NATO reinforcement. Of these, at least 400





The majority of the tanker fleet today is not acceptable
for the transportation of jet fuel and other refined pro-
ducts. These products required linings in tanker hulls, and
therefore rapid conversion of crude carriers to military pur-
poses in a crisis would be impossible. It is estimated that
this type of conversion would take 30-90 days. Of the Ameri-
can owned foreign fleet (450 ships) , between 80 and 120 are
coated and should be immediately available as product and/or
16
Bunker C (fuel for gas turbine ships) carriers. Addition-
ally, tankers of over 40,000 tons are not satisfactory for
military contingency use as a petroleum product carrier, be-
cause of unacceptable target size and port facility restric-
tions (e.g. water depth, pier length, etc.).
From World War II to the 1973 Yom Kippur War, more tanker
ships were available for military use than required by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Currently, however, U.S. assets are
clearly inadequate to meet refined product military require-
ments in a total-war situation. U.S. flag and effective U.S.
control ships, although of great value to the military, are
primarily of utility to the nation for their value in the
continuing economic reliance on oil. With that in mind, a
quantitative analysis of the U.S. flag and effective U.S.
controlled tankship fleets will follow.
Insight provided by Mr. Eugene Yourch, Executive Secre-




D. U.S. FLAG AND EFFECTIVE U.S. CONTROLLED TANKSHIP ASSETS
1. Scope of the Analysis
The analysis that follows is intended to provide in-
sight into the adequacy of U.S. tankship assets to meet the
economic requirements of the nation through transportation
of oil imports. Information on oil imports for 1981 and
historical data on oil imports and consumption are provided,
while projections of import trends are included as a basis
for measure of shipping adequacy.
The analysis of tankship assets will use regression
modeling to arrive at predictors for expected levels of tank-
ship availability under the U.S. flag and individual effec-
tive U.S. control flags at five year intervals from 1985 to
2000. In general, the reliability of the coefficients was
quite good. In all cases data utilized are the most current
available (usually through end-year 1980)
.
For carrying capacity predictions a worst case (Per-
sian Gulf) situation was chosen to demonstrate capacity in
relation to an inflexible situation. Shorter and less vul-
nerable transportation routes would obviously increase total
capacity, but are of less heuristic value in perceiving the
limitations placed on U.S. assets.
2. The Model
Multiple linear regression modeling was used to ana-
lyze the trends in world tankship availability and U.S. oil
consumption and import. Computer modeling was conducted
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using the Statistical Analysis System (SAS) , Interactive
Data Analysis (IDA) and Advanced Program Language (APL)
software packages. In the first case, the independent
variable was YEAR and the dependent variable was DEADWEIGHT
TONNAGE. In the second case, the independent variable was
YEAR and the dependent variable was BARRELS PER DAY. Sin-
gle linear regressions were conducted on the U.S. flag fleet
and individual countries of the effective U.S. control fleet
to predict capacity (1985 to 2000) . The simple linear re-
gression model was used with the Texas Instrument TI-59
calculator. This model was used in conjunction with Intro-
ductory Statistics , THIRD EDITION by Wonnacott and Wonnacott,
and the associated supplement by Prof. Peter Zehna of the
Naval Postgraduate School. Again, the independent variable
was YEAR and the dependent variable was DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE.
A classical two-sided t-test using the simple linear regres-
sion model was conducted (D.F. = 7; t/2 = 2.365 for 95% C.I.)
for a H^ : B = in each case. To test the hypothesis that
there was no simple linear regression of Y on X, that is,
Hq : B, = against H,: B, # 0, the F ratio was used from





The P value was the area to the right of Fq under the F fre-
quency curve. Hf, was rejected if P was less than the
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significant level of L (.05). Thus, the hypothesis that
S = was rejected as well. When 8 5^ ^ it qualified as an
estimator for X. For purposes of the analysis, X (dependent
variable) = DWT.
The tests which were conducted measured the relation-
2
ship of deadweight tonnage to years. The R values in all
the models explains how much of that relationship is ac-
2
counted for in the respective model. As noted, an R value
approaching 1.00 is almost indicative of a perfect correla-
tion between year and DITT . Thus, years are a good way of
predicting DWT growth (the model is very nearly linear)
.
The F statistic in all cases was extremely high indi-
cating that the means of the parameters being compared were
not close to equality. In the case of the independent and
dependent variables under consideration this is not a sur-
prising result. It could have been transformation (such as
a logarithmic transformation) to scale the data. In that no
useful insight would be attained by doing this, it was not
done in this case.
An underlying assumption in all models was the exis-
tence of normality in the distribution of the data set, e.g.
deadweight tonnage, barrels per day, etc.
99

3. The World Tankship Fleet
Table III provides historical data on the world tank-
1
8
ship fleet. Table IV provides a statistical analysis (SAS)
of the data. A dummy variable was incorporated after initial
computer runs in an attempt to eliminate a noted cyclical
error. This dummy variable was introduced to account for the
closing of the Suez Canal in 1967, the low T value associated
with its coefficient (0.85) makes it a poor predictor of that
variable.
Figure 2 provides a plot of DWT versus year. Graph-
ing technique is based on Interactive Data Analysis by Donald
R. McNeil [Ref . 173]
.
From the data, Y values (DWT) are predicted from 1985
to 2000 at five year intervals using IDA (Table V) . Bounding
intervals at the 95% confidence level are also provided. As




U.S. Flag and Effective U.S. Control Tankship Assets
A tonnage analysis of United States flag and effec-
tive U.S. control tankship assets is provided in Table VI.
Single linear regressions were conducted on the data using
the TI-59 calculator as follows:
1
8
Data provided for analysis in this section is from
Analysis of World Tank Ship Fleet
,
provided by the Sun Oil
Company, Inc., for end years 1967, 1970, 1973, 1976, 1979
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Y = 1960 + 1.2734 x lO"^
r = .90
d.f. =n-2=3 (DEGREES OF FREEDOM FOR ALL CALCULATIONS
IN THIS SECTION)
ta/2 - 3.185 for 95% C.I.
$Z = 1.427 X 10""^
u = 2.4042 X 10"^







Y = 1967 + (2.34 x 10"'^)X
r = .97
Si = 1.511 X 10""^










Y = 1058 + (3.3496 x 10~^)X
r = .94
31 = 1.0348 X 10"^







UlTITED KINGDOM "^ ^
Y = 1967 + (1.0402 x 10'^)X
r = .59
Si = -1.5361 X 10"^
u = 3.6164 X 10"^
Hq : B = is ACCEPTED and therefore B is not a good pre-
dictor. This may be the case because of the opening of the
North Sea pipelines in 1980, which could be expected to de-
crease British reliance on tankers to ship oil resources.
19Although data for United Kingdom and other countries










Y = 1163 + (1.549 X 10"^_X
r = .99
Ql = 9.973 X 10'"^








TOTAL U. S. ASSETS ALL COUNTRIES
Y = 1963 + (1.813 X 10"'^)X
r = .98
^Z = 1.205 X 10""^
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5. U.S. Petroleum Transportation Capacity
To truly understand the magnitude of the capability
of U.S. assets to transport crude oil, a conversion from
deadweight tonnage to barrels per day capacity is necessary,
To accomplish this, a worst case scenario was chosen where
distances involved would be maximized, taxing capacity to
the limit. This would involve a round trip with individual
legs as follows:
NEVJ YORK - CAPE OF GOOD HOPE: 6,801NM
CAPE OF GOOD HOPE - AL BASRAH (MOUTH
PERSIAN GULF BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN): 5,211NM
NEW YORK - AL BASRAH: 12,012NM [Ref. 174]
Thus round trip distance for this scenario is 24,024 NM.
The equations used to convert DWT to barrels per day
are as follows:
(1) ^^^ ^•'•^!?^^^ + 4 (AVERAGE MAX. ROUND TRIP PORT TIME = R
R = ROUND TRIP TIME IN DAYS
i7\ 365 DAYS/YR ^ ^
^^' R DAYS /ROUND TRIP
N = NUMBER OF ROUND TRIPS PER YEAR




(4) ^ = DTC
DTC = DAILY TRANSPORT CAPACITY
(5) DTC X 7.46 BARRELS /D .W.T. = BARRELS/DAY
Applying the above calculations to the data provided
in Table VI, U.S. petroleum transport capacity by flag of
registry is indicated in Table VII.
Again utilizing the linear regression program with
the TI-59 calculator, the following results were obtained:
U.S. FLAG CAPACITY
MAXIMUM CAPACITY
Y = 1960 + (1.09901 X 10~^)X
r = .93
= 2.8457 X 10"^








Y = 1.60 + (1.34914 X 10"^)X
r = .90
= 1.829 X lO"^
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U.S. PETROLEUM TRANSPORTATION CAPACITY
(INCLUDING U.S. FLAG AND EFFECTIVE-CONTROL FLEET)
MAX. DAILY AVERAGE MAX. AVERAGE
YEAR TRANSPORT CAPACITY
STATES
DTC BARRELS /DAY BARRELS /DAY
UNITED
1968 117,291.48 105,149.98 874,994.44 784,418.85
1971 135,496.03 111,570.60 1,010,800.38 832,316.68
1974 145,618.13 120,304.58 1,086,311.25 897,472.17
1977 177,754.59 147,019.84 1,326,049.24 1,096,768.00
1980 253,516.49 209,446.42 1,891,233.02 1,562,470.30
LIBERIA
1968 150,081.05 123,094.00 1,119,604.70 918,281.26
1971 250,937.41 205,314.72 1,871,993.10 1,535,377.80
1974 412,934.21 338,270.83 3,080,489.20 2,523,500.40
1977 687,536.75 672,530.07 5,129,024.10 4,196,474.30
1980 697,440.56 570,633.18 5,202,906.5 4,256,923.5
PANAMA
1968 42,128.44 34,671.40 314,278.15 258,648.64
1971 67,273.33 55,365.50 501,859.42 413,026.64
1974 60,491.66 49,554.05 451,267.74 369,673.21
1977 84,293.53 68,967.43 628,829.74 514,497.06
1980 89,635.78 73,216.51 668,682.89 546,195.18
TOTAL
1968 309,500.97 262,915.38 2,308,877.30 1,961,348.80
1971 453,706.82 372.750.82 3,384,652.90 2,780,721.10
1974 619,044.00 508,129.46 4,618,068.20 3,790,645.80
1977 949,584.87 778,517.34 7,083,903.10 5,807,739.40










Y = 1966 + (2.4823 x 10"^)X
r = .97
S£ = 1.3863 X 10"^








Y = 1966 + (3.037 x 10"^)X
r = .97
8^ = 1.6958 X 10"^











Y = 1958 + (3.09246 x 10"^)X
r = .93
SI = 8.149 X 10~^








Y = 1958 + (3.79609 x 10"^)X
r = .93
SI = 9.3631 X 10"^









Total U.S. petroleum transport capacity projections
are as follows:
TOTAL U.S. TRANSPORT CAPACITY
MAXIMUM
Y = 1964 + (2 X 10"^)X
r = .98
Ql = 1.3644 X 10"^







Y = 1964 + (2.4571 x 10"^)X
r = .98
32. = 1.6541 X 10"^








Thus, projections indicate that, in a worst case
scenario, total U.S. petroleum transport capacity is impres-
sive. This capacity would, of course, be increased if other
routes were used:
AL3ASRAH - PORT SAID - STR OF GIBRALTAR - NEW YORK: 8,500NM
ALBASRAH - SINGAPORT - SAN FRANCISCO: 11,261 NM [Ref. 175]
It would be increased even more if oil sources were diversi-
fied, which, of course, they are.
The worst case scenario chosen for the analysis
makes several potentially controversial assiomptions. First,
it assumes total availability of shipping on a continuous
basis. Second, it assumes total availability of port fa-
cilities to on and offload. Lack of deepwater ports would
prove to be a significant limiting factor in that few U.S.
ports can accommodate Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) or
Ultra Large Crude Carriers (ULCCs) . This, however, is beyond
the scope of this analysis. Another assumption is total ac-
cessibility to oil in whatever quantity is desired. This too
could prove to be a distinctly erroneous assumption.
The model does demonstrate, however, a valid measure
of carrying capacity against which exogenous variables can be
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applied to produce a more reliable indicator. The model,
however, has little value without some idea of U.S. oil im-
port requirements over time.
6. United States Oil Consumption Patterns
Oil consumption patterns in the United States, in
terms of imports and total consumption, are as indicated in
Table VIII. Table IX provides a statistical analysis of the
data using the SAS computer program. As indicated by the
Burbin-Watson statistic (0.6428), a Type I serial correlation
(cyclic) exists. This was confirmed by examination of a
plot of the residuals (not included) . Additionally, the T
statistic for YEAR is low, thus indicating unreliability of
the coefficient of that variable for predictive purposes.
A plot of oil imports by year is provided for con-
venience in Figure 3.
Again using the TI-59 calculator for a single linear
regression of DWT on year, the following projections were
obtained:
U.S. OIL IMPORTS VS. YEAR
Y = 1958 + (2.9335 x 10"^)X
r = .91








U.S. OIL IMPORTS 1960-1981 (42 Gal. Barrels/Day)
YEAR II«1P0RTS TOTAL CONSUMPTION
1960 1,820,000 9 ,660 ,000
1961 1,920,000 9 ,810 ,000
1962 2,080,000 10,,230 ,000
1963 2,120,000 10 ,550 ,000
1964 2,260,000 10,,820 ,000
1965 2,470,000 11-,300 ,000
1966 2,570,000 11 ,350 ,000
1967 2,540,000 12,,280 ,000
1968 2,810,000 13 ,080 ,000
1969 3,170,000 13 ,810 ,000
1970 3,420,000 14 ,370 ,000
1971 3,930,000 14 ,845 ,000
1972 4,740,000 15 ,990 ,000
1973 6,255,000 16 ,870 ,000
1974 6,125,000 16 ,150 ,000
1975 6,025,000 15 ,875 ,000
1976 7,290,000 16 ,980 ,000
1977 8,710,000 17 ,925 ,000
1978 8,225,000 18 ,225 ,000
1979 8,410,000 17 ,910 ,000

























SOURCE: BRITISH PETROLEUM STATISTICAL REVIEW OF THE WORLD
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TOTAL U.S. OIL CONSUIIPTION VS. YEAR
Y = 1939 + (2.2029 x 10"^)X
r = .97





Comparing imports to total consiimption rates:
Y = 8523.69 x 10"^ + (1.263 x 10^)X
r = .95
IF IMPORTS THEN CONSUMPTION
9,000,000 19,886,610
10,000,000 21,149,157
Recent Presidential initiatives to limit U.S. re-
liance on imported oil and a general consumer trend toward
conservation has, since 1978, produced a decline in oil im-
ports and, since 1979, a decrease in total oil consumption.
I'Thile in subsequent years an actual decrease in per capita
oil consumption can be expected as both consumption patterns
and technological innovations stress resource conservation,
population increases will almost invariably cause absolute
increases in total U.S. oil consumption over time. Where
some bounding is likely to take place on overall petroleum
120

usage, it still should display at least some degree of
linearity over time.
7 . Comparing Transport Capacity to Import Requirement
When total U.S. oil transportation capacity and
yearly U.S. oil import predictions are compared, some in-
teresting insights are gained. In an absolute worst case
peacetime scenario, maximum transport rate is predicted to
stay ahead and even increase at a more rapid rate than oil
imports over the long term. Table X is most instructive in
indicating which nations and regional areas are most heavily
20
relied on for access to oil by the United States. Although
40.3 percent of U.S. oil imports comes from Arab OPEC states,
with Saudi Arabia the largest single import source (25.4%),
only 27.3 percent of U.S. imports actually came from the Per-
sian Gulf region in 1981. Nigeria, Mexico and Indonesia all
rank as large oil exporters to the United States, together
supplying 31.9 percent of crude imports. This diversifica-
tion of access to oil resources also significantly increases
transportation capacity while decreasing its vulnerability.
It also serves as a hedge against aggressive actions in
Southwest Asia by the Soviets or a surrogate to attempt
destabilization of the U.S. economy and military capacity.
20Table X was produced by compiling data from U.S. De-
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8. Conclusions Drawn from the Analysis
U.S. flag tankship assets, in combination with ef-
fective U.S. control assets, provide a transportation capa-
city for crude oil products in excess of current economic
and military need. There are, however, distinct limitations
on U.S. ability to transport refined petroleum products.
This is strategically significant in that refined products
are those most critical to military operations.
Table XI provides data on U.S. and effective U.S.
control tankship aging and speed trends. Speeds as indicated
were used in the preceding analysis. Average speeds reflect
an attempt at economy in operations. Average age and aging
trends of effective control assets demonstrate a propensity
toward replacement of obsolescent assets more expeditiously
than is the case with U.S. flag assets. Since the bulk of
transport capacity rests with the effective control fleet,
this is an encouraging trend.
Economic factors have been demonstrated to have
played a large part in the shift to flags of convenience by
U.S. shipowners. In a like manner, market forces have de-
termined the availability of oil transport capacity. There-
fore, a direct linkage between oil import requirements and
oil transport capacity is evident. If bounding takes place
in one area, it should also be seen in the other. Thus, as




CARRYING CAPACITY OF U.S. AND
U.S. EFFECTIVE CONTROL TANKSHIP FLEET
UNITED STATES
YEAR NO. DWT AV. AGE AV. SPD
1968 378 8,361,600 16 YR. 2 MO. 16.1
1971 350 8,911,000 16 YR. 5 MO. 16.2
1974 312 9,525,200 15 YR. 6 MO. 16.3
1977 290 11,565,138 13 YR. 3 MO. 16.4
1980 314 16,583,068 11 YR. 3 MO. 16.3
LIBERIA
YEAR NO. DWT AV. AGE AV. SPD
1968 235 10,051,300 7 YR. 10 MO. 15.9
1971 287 16,805,900 7 YR. 8 MO. 15.9
1974 361 27,808,300 7 YR. MO. 15.8
1977 408 46,558,611 6 YR. 1 MO. 15.7
1980 339 47,229,277 7 YR. 4 MO. 15.7
PANAMA
YEAR NO. DWT AV. AGE AV. SPD
1968 87 2,806,000 10 YR. 9 MO. 16.0
1971 113 4,480,800 11 YR. 5 MO. 16.0
1974 99 4,073,700 12 YR. MO. 15.8
1977 90 5,708,189 9 YR. 5 MO. 15.7
1980 70 6,115,338 9 YR. 7 MO. 15.6
U.S. OIL CONSUMPTION
IMPORTS













V. OIL AND GRAND STRATEGY; THE STRATEGIC LINK
A. INTRODUCTION
The value of oil to modern economies is great, although
impossible to assess accurately. It is relatively cheap to
extract, and easy to transport and store. It can be used to
produce energy, electricity and fuel for various modes of
transportation and, perhaps most important, can be utilized
in quantities commensurate with actual need. In the conduct
of modern warfare, oil is the single resource without which
operations can not be conducted. Even in an age of rapid
technological advance, the availability of petroleum re-
sources remains indispensable in both the planning and execu-
tion of military strategy. Therefore, because of both its
economic and military value, the securing of access to oil
and provision for its transportation becomes an interest of
paramount national importance.
In both the First and Second World Wars, oil availability
proved to be a significant determinant of military success.
Without it, the war-making apparatus of any belligerent would
have ground to a halt. The security, protection and trans-
portation of oil became a prominent issue which received much
attention in the formulation of strategies of the Wars. In
the words of French Senator Henry Berenger in providing
counsel to Clemenceau before he met with Lloyd George to
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discuss the political future of the Middle East prior to
World War II:
He who owns the oil will own the world, for he will
rule the sea by means of the heavy oils, the air by means
of the ultra-refined oils, and the land by means of petro
and illuminating oils. And in addition to these he will
rule his fellow men in an economic sense, by reason of the
fantastic wealth he will derive from oil—the wonderful
substance which is more sought after and more precious
today than gold itself. [Ref. 176]
Today, as it has throughout this century, oil plays a
dominant role in the formulation of national economic and
military policy. Without it the economies of the Western
powers would be decimated, as would their ability to provide
for national security. For this reason, continued supply of
oil resources remains a vital political, economic and mili-
tary objective. It also presents an area of vulnerability
exploitable by the Soviet Union. The Middle East, as the
predominant producer of oil, has become the focal point of
competition for control of this vital resource. Along what
lines future competition might take place, at this point,
remains conjecture. From a strategic standpoint, however, it
is essential that contingencies be considered so that unin-
terrupted flow of oil will continue.
Consequently the remainder of this chapter will be de-
voted to development of possible conflict scenarios for
Southwest Asia. In each, the primary consideration will be
the effect on U.S. ability to retain access to Middle East
oil resources and to transport those resources. The
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interdependence of the United States and her NATO allies, in
both an economic and strategic sense, will be stressed. Be-
fore any scenarios are developed, however, a discussion of
the impact of oil resources on grand strategy and eventual
military victory in World Wars I and II, as well as how it
relates to the military relationship between the major
Western nations, should prove insightful. Additionally in
that transportation of oil resources is as important to the
Western powers as access to these resources, a critique of
the capacity and capabilities of the United States in this
area will be provided.
B. OIL AND WAR
1 . Historical Context
Much has been written about grand strategies for war,
and on the role of military genius in determining the outcome
of war, but little consideration overall is given to the role
of strategic resources as the driving factor in the formula-
tion of grand strategies. For almost 200 years prior to
World War I, England was the most important maritime power
in the world. Challenged at regular intervals, she was able
to maintain her position through a strong economic base and
employment of a seaborne military peripheral strategy. Her
cibility to effect this strategy was not coincidental. An
island nation, England was of necessity a seafaring nation.
Her economic interests were thus closely tied to her merchant
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shipping capacity, which was vulnerable to attack on the
high seas. Therefore, the creation of a strong navy to pro-
tect her economic interests was a logical outcome. It also
allowed employment of a peripheral strategy, which was well
suited to British military capabilities. In this respect,
British economic and military necessities were intrinsically
linked.
The onset of the twentieth century greatly altered
the relationship between nations in several respects. The
perfection of the internal combustion engine ushered in
great technological advances in both production and trans-
portation. In that economies were now increasingly linked
to oil, as a prerequisite for mechanization, competition for
this resources became more pronounced. The same advances in
transportation technology that demonstrated such promise for
the economic sector had even a more profound effect on the
military sector.
2. Oil and World War I
By the start of the First World War, the shift to
mechanization had already begun in the military establish-
ments of all the major world powers. Possibly no single
entity has become more transportation-dependent than the
military. Operations and logistics in ground, naval and air
units became increasingly dependent on oil-based technology
during the War, and have continued in a like manner ever
since. The composition of forces, their manner of employment,
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and limitations on national military capabilities all have
been determined to large extent by the resource base to sup-
port mobile units. Once forces are joined, oil availability
has become the primary limiting factor in continuing economic
and military support of the war effort.
Prior to World War I, the British, fearing the great
firepower of the new German battleships, decided to produce
a superior naval platform—the Dreadnought class of battle-
ships—capable of carrying a fifteen-inch gun. To add to
the decisiveness of a ship so armed, the fleet was converted
to oil in 1911-1912 [Ref . 177] . This increased effective
cruising range by approximately 40 percent and, with support
from tanker ships equipped for at-sea replenishment, greatly
increased fleet mobility and flexibility [Ref. 178] . Since
Britain, like France and Germany, had little indigenous oil
production, this resource gained significant attention.
Creation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in 1912 in an area
already subject to British influence because of her trading
interests marked the beginning of competition between Brit-
ish, Russian and German interests in the resources of the
Persian Gulf.
Though the competition for Middle East oil had little
to do with the outbreak of World War I, it had a significant
impact on the conduct and outcome of the war effort. Due to
lack of desired mobility, the belligerents were forced into
a war of attrition, i.e. the ability to successfully diminish
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the other side's will and capacity to continue the conflict
became the main means of achieving victory. Oil, increasing-
ly after the advent of mechanized land, sea and air warfare
was applied in a large scale after 1916, became strategically
important to the war effort. Its place was no longer rele-
gated to consideration from only a logistical standpoint. It
directly affected the outcome of the war as much if not more
than shelling or bombing. The dependency of both the econom-
ic sector and the military establishment on the availability
of oil to conduct the war effort, however, produced new prob-
lems. Among these were securing access to and providing
security for oil as a vital national resource. Also, trans-
portation of oil had to be conducted via secure sea lanes.
The logistical problems posed by oil dependency were enor-
mous. Sea lines were extended and used more heavily,
making them more vulnerable to interdiction. Tankers be-
came important targets, not only for the fuel they carried
at the time of their sinking, but also because the destruc-
tion of a tanker fleet was tantamount to severing all oil
supplies. Oil fields proved to be relatively resilient
targets, while pipelines, railways, storage tanks, and
tankers were more vulnerable. The denial of an enemy's
supply, through either blockade or the active destruction
of fields, stocks, or transport networks, became as much
a part of strategy as the security of one's own supply.
[Ref. 179]
In many respects , the situation of total economic
cind military reliance on oil was beginning to shape the for-
mulation of grand strategy on the part of the major powers
as never before.
The German reliance on oil during World War I was no
less dramatic than that of Britain. Relying on Standard Oil,
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an American company, for over 90 percent of her fuel needs
at the start of the war, Germany could count on only about
210,000 tons of oil from politically secure sources compared
to a consumption of one million tons a year reached by 1913
[Ref. 180].
Things did not go well for the Germans before World War I
in the Persian Gulf and Mesopotamia generally. Persia was
lost to the British and Russians, and the Berlin-Baghdad
Railway was unable to reach potentially rich oil fields in
Iraq by 1914. Thus, the Germans were unable to break the
hold of Standard Oil on their sources of supply. At the
outbreak of war, Germany was limited to oil from domestic
sources and Galacia. The need for oil thus exerted in-
fluence over their later strategy in Rumania and the Cau-
casus [Ref. 181]
.
The German decision to invade Rumania after having war de-
clared on her by that nation in 1916 was precipitated large-
ly by an increasing need for oil to fuel the war effort.
Subsequent to Brest-Litovsk, the German campaign to take the
Baku oil fields had the same genesis. Due to inadequate oil
supply, the German war effort was adversely affected in the
west.
In the face of new mechanization, especially in the
use of tanks by the Allies to alter the lines drawn in trench
warfare, oil also played a central role. The Germans for all
practical purposes used no tanks in World Wor I (only a few
captured Allied and a handful of German design) . By late
1915, the Allied blockade of Germany was beginning to have
significant effect in denying other critical resources,
including food. The lack of oil also hindered German use of
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the submarine to alter this condition. All in all, through
a cumulative strategy of resource denial, Germany was gradu-
ally deprived of the capacity to continue the war effort.
Without overwhelming military defeat or complete loss of
support for the war effort on the home front, Geirmany none-
theless was forced to surrender to the Allied powers.
Though this was not because of lack of oil, low oil reserves
nonetheless contributed to her defeat. The lesson this pro-
vided was not lost on the Allies, or the Germans for that
matter, and it provided a significant basis for the formula-
tion of Grand Strategy for World War II.
3. Oil and World War II
a. Strategic Resources and the War in Europe
The causes of the Second World War were manyfold,
reflecting primarily on the inequities established at Ver-
sailles in the aftermath of World War I . Arbitrary terri-
torial borders, reparations, establishment of war guilt, and
an overall decline in the world market economy all contri-
buted to a situation where German adherence to democratic
norms had little chance of success. Accompanying this situa-
tion was an overriding German desire to reclaim her rightful
place in the world community. As Hitler rose to power in
January, 1933, there were other problems to be dealt with.
These included increased German access to resources of all
types and to arable land for expansion of German agriculture.
Lack of resources had greatly inhibited Germany, and, as much
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as any other factor, contributed to her inability to func-
tion in accordance with her other attributes of national
power
.
There was also an important underlying structural problem
—
the uneven global distribution of raw materials among in-
dustrial states—that contributed directly to a collapse
of world peace. In earlier times the size of a nation's
territory and population, its military forces, and treasury
wealth largely determined its comparative power and pres-
tige. But in the twentieth century secure access to a vast
quantity and variety of natural resources also became a
key determinant of power. Coal, petroleum, iron, and
copper, in particular, became the four indispensable ma-
terials for defense production and war-making. Smaller
quantities of other materials--especially mica, tin,
chrome, manganese, nickel, and tungsten—were also vital
to national security. [Ref. 182]
By the late 1920s, Germany was extremely depen-
dent on external sources for fuel and raw materials. Eighty
percent of iron ore, eighty-five percent of liquid fuel, and
almost half of all metal and mineral requirements were im-
ported as late as 1929 [Ref. 183]. Throughout the 1930s,
Hitler strove to correct this situation.
That Germany must pursue a path toward self-sufficiency
in order to reduce its economic vulnerability and prepare
for the eventual war against Russia emerged in Hitler's
192 6 memorandum outlining a four-year economic program.
In this statement the Nazi leader spelled out his convic-
tion that the war would be a series of short hard blows,
not a war of attrition like World War I, for Hitler doubted
his enemies would allow Germany to prepare adequately for
an extended war within his own lifetime. Determined to
prepare the German economy and military for a conflict
within four years. Hitler proposed a major airmaments build-
up and use of existing foreign exchange for obtaining what-
ever materials were required to facilitate the arms
preparations. He opposed Schacht ' s favorite panacea,
export expansion, because it would simply delay completion
of the arms program. "In four years," said Hitler, "Ger-
many must be completely independent of foreign countries
so far as concerns those materials which by any means
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through German skill, through our chemical and machine
industry or through our mining industry we can ourselves
produce .
"
This document was no directive for autarky, or self-
sufficiency. Rather Hitler sought to conserve German re-
sources while accumulating vital raw materials from abroad
in order to improve prospects for a successful war. "The
definitive solution," Hitler said, "lies in an extension
of our living space, that is, an extension of the raw ma-
terials and food basis of our nation." [Ref. 184]
Germany's pre-war economic strategy was thus driven by a de-
sire for self-sufficiency. With respect to oil, and its
relationship to the military machine on which Hitler knew he
must rely heavily, he was particularly pointed in his con-
ceptualization of German grand strategy.
Hitler believed that Germany lacked the economic strength
—
especially because of its dependence on imported raw ma-
terials—to fight a prolonged war. For these domestic
political, balance-of-power , and other operational military
reasons, he developed the strategy of the blitzkrieg: the
war must be fought quickly and decisively, presenting the
countries to be conquered and allies that might be tempted
to join the war with faits accomplis, and securing as
quickly as possible the desired stocks of raw materials.
This was a broad, perceptive, and highly opportunistic
grand strategy. It was clearly aimed at avoiding the
enormous social strains imposed by the "total war" stra-
tegy. [Ref. 185]
It is somewhat ironic that the blitzkrieg, relying so heavily
on mechanization and thus on petroleum products, was con-
ceived in part as a means of decreasing the liabilities in-
herent in a lack of oil resources.
Britain's announced intention to rearm and resist
any German move against Poland placed Hitler in a precarious
position. The invasion of Poland on 1 September, 1939, had
to be completed before British rearmament could progress to a
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point where the British could contest Germany militarily.
Yet German fuel stocks were well short of those desired by
The German General Staff. "Only 492,000 tons (or about one-
third the desired level) of aviation fuel and 1,118,000 tons
(or about two-fifths) of diesel and fuel oil were in reserve
for the Polish operations, as opposed to the desired levels
of 1,500,000 tons and 2,800,000 tons respectively" [Ref.
186] . The campaigns in Poland (Sep. 1939) and France (May-
June, 1940), conducted in the blitzkrieg mode, contributed
even further to depletion of German oil reserves. Though
the blitzkrieg was designed in part to eliminate adversary
ability to extract a cumulative effect on Germany's capacity
to conduct warfare, it placed a severe limitation on the
German military capability to conduct the type of operations
necessary for continued success on the battlefield. Lacking
critical access to oil, German synthetic petroleum production
was pressed to the limit to provide adequate levels of petro-
leum for the German maneuver style of warfare.
Throughout the Second World War, oil played a
significant role in the formulation of German grand strategy.
Since lack of domestic reserves forced Germany to rely pri-
marily on Rumanian oil, access to other sources of petroleum
and production of synthetic fuels became an important adjunct
of German planning. Between 1939 and 1944, synthetic pro-
duction increased from 1.3 to 4.5 million tons per year,
peaking at a rate of between 5 and 6 million tons per year
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as compared to a maximum domestic crude production of 1.4
million tons per year [Ref . 187]
.
As outlined by Hitler in Me in Kampf ^ the German
advance into the Soviet Union was in part the result of a
desire to expand access to oil and strategic resources.
Failure to consolidate gains in the oil-rich Caucasus during
the Russian Campaign in 1942 and failure to support Rommel in
a manner which would have ensured his continued advance after
Operation Venezia (May 1942) contributed to a severe shortage
of petroleum assets during 1943 and subsequently [Ref. 188]
.
Allied Strategic bombing of oil fields and synthetic fuel and
hydro-generation plants after May, 1944, exacerbated the
German dilemma.
Through a cumulative strategy of resource denial,
especially of oil denial, the Allied Powers were able to
gradually decrease German ability to conduct the war effort
in the agressive manner required in her earlier successes.
Lacking not only fuel for mobile and air forces, but chemi-
cals for the production of munitions as well, the German
counteroffensive at Ardennes and operations against the So-
viets in Silesia were much less effective than they other-
wise might have been. All things considered, Germany
acquitted herself quite well in the latter stages of World





Great Britain was no less subject to disruption
of oil resources than was Germany during the War. Germany
attempted, from the outset, to take advantage of British re-
liance on seaborne resource transportation to limit her
military capability in the conflict.
As early as October 1939, Admiral Raeder had advocated a
combined all-out siege by the Luftwaffe and U-boat command
against British SLOCs and industrial and port facilities.
By 1942 the German U-boat offensive had come dangerously
close to seriously restricting the Allied war economies,
sinking ships faster than they could be built during much
of 1942. The German focus on tankers caused direct oil
shortages in Britain and the United States, but the losses
of tankers themselves posed a far more serious threat.
[Ref. 189]
British supremacy on the high seas. United States entry into
the war, and the advent of the convoy system all contributed
to the eventual inability of Germany to halt the British
logistics system. Curtailment of U-boat operations in the
latter stages of the war due to lack of fuel also contri-
buted, but to a lesser extent.
Allied grand strategy was also centered signi-
ficantly on the critical aspects of oil during World War II.
As the War progressed, the Allies became more and more aware
of the criticality of oil to the outcome of the war and
altered strategy accordingly.
The Allies and the Germans stood at opposite extremes
on the integration of fuel supplies into the operational,
logistical, aind technological dimensions of strategy.
Fatally flawed French strategy lacked mechanization and
mobility, including even the assumption that tanks would
have to return to support bases after consuming all their
fuel. U.S. and British strategy lacked adequate attention
to fuel supply, especailly in the total neglect of airborne
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logistics support for ground forces in the face of enormous
emphasis on strategic bombing was the total concentration
of German efforts on motorized and airborne logistics for
the blitzkrieg. Fighters disrupted French and Allied lo-
gistics behind the lines and JU-52s, building on the ex-
perience from the Spanish Civil War, and served as cargo
planes for fuel, bombs, and supplies, providing the Luft-
waffe with unprecedented mobility. The Germans did, how-
ever, fail to follow through on two crucial opportunities
in 1941 and 1942 to seize the Soviet oil fields at Baku.
The controversy over the opening of a "second front"
was complex, involving many strategic and political con-
siderations. In brief, the United States and the Soviet
Union favored a direct offensive against the European
continent at the earliest possible date. The British
realized that until the United States had sufficient time
to become fully mobilized a full scale invasion would have
to be largely British. Never a strong land power, Britain
would not be able to seriously challenge Hitler under these
conditions. Britain could well be faced with another
Dunkirk.
The British therefore favored a more gradual, peri-
pheral approach to confronting the Germans . Their strategy
favored a protracted war of attrition on the German economy,
utilizing intensive strategic bombing and blockades to-
gether with an attack on what Churchill referred to as
"Germany's soft underbelly": the Mediterranean. The stra-
tegy would not only avoid a full-scale land confrontation
with Hitler's armies but also would provide stronger con-
trol over their empire, particularly the oil-rich Middle
East.
Indeed, the British did make several strategic deci-
sions to protect the Middle East from German control. In
1942, when the Germans were as close as the Caucasus, a
large number of British troops were withdrawn from Egypt
and the war with Rommel to safeguard the Iranian oil
fields. Similarly, the British occupation of Southern
Iran was largely aimed at controlling Iranian oil. [Ref.
190]
More than any other single resource, oil determined the final
outcome of World War II in Europe.
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b. Oil and Grand Strategy in the Pacific
Unlike the war in Europe, Japanese entry into
World War II was caused primarily because of concern for
access to oil. As late as 1939, Japan purchased 80 percent
of her oil from the United States, and most of the remainder
from British and U.S. firms in the Dutch East Indies [Ref.
191] . Desiring to extend its influence and hegemony through-
out Southeast Asia, the Japanese found that oil was the one
resource that could not be stockpiled in sufficient quanti-
ties to ensure immunity from external political coersion.
The lack of oil produced a dependency relationship on the
United States, which advanced an "open door" policy in Asia
that ran directly contrary to Japanese policy goals.
From the mid-1930s on, the possibility of an oil
embargo against Japan was considered by the United States.
The Japanese invasion of China nearly brought on such an em-
bargo, but the State Department, reluctant to force Japan
into an untenable situation, prevailed against such sanc-
tions. The invasion of Indochina in July, 1941, caused
President Roosevelt to effectively end all oil exports to
Japan by executive order [Ref. 192].
Negotiations to restore trade in exchange for a partial
or total withdrawal of Japanese forces from occupied terri-
tory went on through the fall of 1941, but were never close
to achieving success. The Japanese calculated that they
had a maximum of 19 months' peacetime oil consumption equi-
valent in stock by late 1941, including only about 90 to
120 days' supply for the fleet. They perceived their stra-
tegic options as: (1) acquiescing in agreement with the
United States, and gradually relinquishing control over all
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conquered territory; (2) doing nothing and facing steadily
declining stocks; or (3) moving boldly to take control of
the Netherlands East Indies, especially its rubber and oil
supplies. Since the United States had recently begun
building air bases in the Philippines, and late 1941 stock
figures showed rapidly declining levels, it was the time
to act. Japanese occupation of Manchuria, China, and Thai-
land ensured adequate supplies of most strategic materials,
food, and other important equipment, but a critical short-
age remained in oil.
In formulating their strategy for the Pacific war, the
Japanese knew that the only way to protect the supply line
to the Indies was to oust the United States from bases in
the Philippines, Guam, and Wake and to oust the British
from Singapore. An attack on Pearl Harbor would be essen-
tial to prevent the U.S. fleet from interrupting tanker
lines and other flows of essential wartime resources from
the East Indies to Japan. If the empire were to be even
maintained, action seemed necessary. [Ref. 193]
The desperate gamble of attacking Pearl Harbor came as a
prelude to the invasion of the Dutch East Indies in January
of 1942.
In response, the United States employed a sequen-
tial strategy of island-hopping to eliminate pockets of re-
sistance in the drive toward the Japanese mainland. More
successful, however, was the U.S. cumulative strategy of
resource denial which eventually led to the economic and
military collapse of Japan in early 1945. By February of
1945, Japanese oil stocks, which had stood at 43 million
barrels in December 1942, were down to 3 million barrels
[Ref. 194] . The employment of submarines in the Pacific by
the United States, as well as effective air interdiction of
shipping routes, led directly to the collapse of the Japanese
war effort. The entire Japanese strategy in World War II
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was aimed at gaining access to oil, in particular, and to a
lesser extent other strategic resources. Needless to say,
the U.S. strategy was based to a large extent on denying
access to the resources needed by Japan.
C. STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Subsequent to World War II, the Great Powers of the
Western Alliance in Europe have found themselves in a situa-
tion similar to that of Germany and Japan. Once assured of
adequate oil for commercial and military purposes from pro-
tectorates in the Middle East, these nations are now in-
creasingly reliant on fragile political situations in the
area. They are also vulnerable to any entity capable of
denying them the oil reserves they need.
The situation which has most clearly changed the rela-
tionship between Western Europe and Suez was the Suez crises
of 1956-1957:
The sizable literature of historical and personal ac-
counts of Suez in 1956-1957 concentrates on the management
of the crisis and its global implications. Suez marked a
climax in the steady erosion of the perceived and actual
independent international power of Britain and France. It
also shifted the strategic balance of power in the Middle
East toward the Soviet Union and Arab nationalists. Un-
documented, however, are the ways oil influenced the out-
break, conduct, and outcome of the crisis, including grand
strategy and alliance cohesion for the 1960s and beyond.
By the mid 1950s, the Suez Canal served as a vital
artery for much of West European trade. The total tonnage
passing through the canal increased about 50 per cent be-
tween 1951 and 1955, reaching approximately 207 million
tons. About one-quarter of all British imports and exports
passed through the canal.
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oil stood out as the canal's most vital cargo. In
1956 Western Europe obtained 75 per cent of its oil from
the Middle East with one half of this oil coming through
the canal and the rest through Mediterranean pipelines.
[Ref. 195]
French, and to a lesser extent British, economic and military
fortunes were tied directly to free access to the Canal for
transportation of oil resources.
The Suez Crisis was to large extent the result of mis-
perceptions concerning the intentions of several nations with
interests in the Middle East. The French, in 1954-55, ex-
tended military ties with Israel which, in turn, raided the
Gaza strip in February, 1955. This caused concern on the
part of the Nasser government in Egypt. Additionally, the
ousting from power of Molenkov in the Soviet Union in 1955
and his replacement by Bulganin as Prime Minister, coupled
with the conservative Molotov's fall from power in early
1957, led to a drive by the Khrushchev government for in-
creased influence in the Middle East. This in turn led to
indirect arms transfers from the Soviet Union (through
Czechoslovakia) to Egypt. The move by Nasser into the Soviet
camp caused John Foster Dulles to announce cancellation of
the symbolic loan offer for the Aswan Dam project. Nasser
retaliated a week later by the provocative step of national-
izing the Suez Canal Company and seizing the canal [Ref. 196] .
European dependence on Middle East oil, and on the Suez
Canal for its transporation, strongly influenced the British
and French in their joint attack on Egypt in October, 1956.
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Unable to obtain U.S. support for this venture, the threat of
loss of access to Middle East oil together with the unavaila-
bility of oil resources controlled by U.S. companies, spurred
the British and French to action.
Fearing increased Soviet influence in the Middle East,
the Eisenhower administration hoped to counter the Soviet
threat through the conclusion of the Baghdad Pact of 1955.
Seeing the Middle East situation as a zero-sum game where
Western losses equated to Soviet gains, Eisenhower was un-
willing to force Nasser irrevocably into the Soviet camp by
supporting British/French adventurism in the area. As a
consequence, the joint Suez operation was doomed to failure,
with catalytic consequences. During the hostilities, Nasser
had closed the canal completely and cut oil flow further by
destroying portions of the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC)
pipeline through Syria.
Without any adjustment, Europe would have lost between 30
and 50 per cent of its normal oil deliveries because of
loss of the IPC pipeline and the extra time required for
tankers to travel the 11,200 miles around the cape instead
of 4,900 miles through the canal. [Ref. 197]
The United States, meanwhile, had sided against her
strong NATO allies in this important crisis. Rather than
alienate the nations of the Middle East completely, Eisen-
hower initially refused to divert U.S. oil to Europe.
Though this stand was subsequently changed, alliance cohe-
sion had been undermined and what had originally been a
question only of oil transportation had become a larger
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question of oil access. Competition for scarce resources
had the consequence of undermining the entire economic sta-
bility of the West.
The lack of support by Washington had the added effect
of forcing the British and French toward more independent
military strategies. The British pursuit of an independent
nuclear capability, the announcement of force reductions
from 700,000 to 375,000 across the three services [Ref. 198],
and the decision in 1968 to withdraw from East of Suez can
all be seen as tied in with the Suez Crisis. Coupled with
losses in Indochina and Algeria, the French development of
an independent nuclear force and withdrawal from NATO's
military arm in 1966 can be linked with the crisis. Lack
of U.S. backing in an area of such obvious economic and
strategic military value, and a realization of the inability
to take action without U.S. support in the face of lack of
vital strategic resources, moved not only the British and
French, but many other Western European nations toward ac-
commodation at any cost to maintain access to needed oil.
D. STRATEGIC TIES TO MEANS OF OIL TRANSPORTATION
Western Europe today does not have the capability to
sustain its economy in the face of any significant military
conflict in which it does not enjoy free access to the oil
resources of Southwest Asia. This implies not only the
necessity for security in the area, but also the capacity to
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transport resources from the area to terminal areas without
experiencing undue attrition. In this respect, U.S. and
European interests are intrinsically linked. Through the
International Energy Agency (lEA) , a subsidiary of the Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
,
procedures for U.S. cooperation in an oil allocation system
will be enacted should oil supplies to a particular member
country or to the signatory group fall below previously de-
termined levels [Ref. 199]. Additionally, U.S. tankship
assets would undoubtedly be utilized, much as in World War
II, to supply both U.S. and NATO requirements in support of
the war effort. Disruption of oil flow to the West and Japan
would only be of long term political advantage to the Soviet
Union. Ironically, as a super power, the Soviet Union is the
only member of the world community which has the capability
to disrupt oil flow from Southwest Asia for protracted peri-
ods. For a variety of reasons, which will be discussed
later, a move against Western oil resources by the Soviets
is highly unlikely. Western perceptions of the efficacy of
such a move by the Kremlin, however, could be greatly in
error. Therefore, a discussion of the means by which the
Soviets could employ existing military and political re-
sources against Western interests in Southwest Asia, and the
Persian Gulf area in particular, will be valuable as a pre-
lude to formulation of U.S. policy for that area.
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E. CONFLICT SCENARIOS FOR SOUTHWEST ASIA
1. Nuclear Conflict Confined to Southwest Asia
Soviet tactical and theatre-strategic assets now
open an avenue to desired political objectives far more
palatable than a frontal assault on Western Europe. From
the Soviet perspective. Western Europe is a prize to be pre-
served rather than an enemy to be destroyed [Ref . 200]
.
Soviet theatre nuclear assets have been structured, there-
fore, to drive a wedge between the United States and the
European members of NATO. Lack of alliance cohesion and a
reluctance to provide the military hardware to counter the
Soviet threat is little by little eroding the capability of
the U.S. to come to the aid of Western Europe against the
Soviet military machine. Thus, the Soviet Union is in-
creasingly moving toward a position of power in its dealings
with Western Europe. It is therefore unlikely that any
direct military action aimed at Western Europe will be
undertaken by the Soviets unless a crisis develops to a
point where the ability of the Super Powers to manage it is
lost. Admittedly, the probability of such a situation is
extremely low.
If, however, such a situation developed, the Persian
Gulf area would offer a target of considerable opportunity
for the Soviet leadership. The capacity for destruction of
Middle East oil producing assets with a fraction of the
theatre-strategic arsenal presents the Soviets with a viable
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means of bringing the European Continent to its knees econo-
mically. Such a move would be undertaken in an area far re-
moved from any real U.S. capability to project power. It
could also serve to further decouple a U.S. SIOP response to
any subsequent adventurism on the part of the Soviet Union
in Western Europe.
The Persian Gulf area provides a preponderance of
oil for nations of the Western Alliance. Percentages of
total oil imports that come from the area are as follows
(1979 approximate figures)
:





JAPAN 73% [Ref. 201]
The strategic and economic impact on the West from the loss
of petroleum resources would alter significantly the balance
of power between the Soviet Union and the United States.
Such an alteration of the "correlation of forces" could be
quickly accomplished without changing the strategic relation-
ship vis-a-vis the United States, or the tactical relation-
ship with respect to Western Europe. In such a scenario
resource denial rather than resource acquisition would be
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the purpose of Soviet use of the surgical nuclear strike
capability.
Soviet weapons systems which could be employed
against Southwest Asia include the SS-20 missile system (of
which over 300 are now in place in the Soviet Union) and the
TU-22M Backfire bomber [Ref . 202] . Both systems have range
capability sufficient to be employed against the entirety of
Southwest Asia. The strategic objective in the area, how-
ever, would be limited to the Persian Gulf concentration of
oil fields and ancilliary equipments (port facilities, pipe-
lines, pumping stations, etc.).
The Soviet combined arms philosophy would indicate
that conventional forces are likely to be used in conjunc-
tion with any nuclear strike, even against Southwest Asia.
This, however, would not be necessary as Soviet goals in
such a scenario would be accomplished without physical occu-
pation merely by knocking out facilities capable of producing
oil for Western consumption.
Such a scenario as Soviet use of nuclear weapons
surgically against the Persian Gulf oil fields is not in
line with either the Soviet conceptualization of space or
time. Viewing space as volume, the use of weaponry for de-
nial without any tangible gains would not be likely. In
terms of time, radical, high risk departures from long-term
political advances are uncharacteristic of Soviet cultural
biases. For these reasons, the Soviet political/military
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interface is more attuned to cumulative strategies than to
sequential strategies such as the one described above.
2. Confrontation at Sea
The recent expansion of the Soviet Navy is cause for
concern in relation to protecting the sea lanes from inter-
diction. Perhaps no vessel is more vulnerable on the high
seas than the petroleum tanker. Even utilizing the pipeline
network which leads from the Persian Gulf to the Mediter-
ranean area, Middle East oil must be transported by sea to
Western Eruope. Japan and the United States are equally de-
pendent on seaborne oil. As demonstrated during the First
and Second World Wars, any time petroleum must be transported
by sea it is vulnerable to interdiction, particularly by
submarine forces. Should the Soviet Union determine that a
necessity existed to overtly attack the economy of Western
Europe, conduct of this attack entirely at sea would provide
several advantages.
Given the strategic nuclear balance, and the theatre
nuclear balance in Europe, a seaborne conflict directed at
Western strategic and economic interests in the Middle East
could prove effective while retaining for the Soviets the
ability to limit the conflict. In this respect, crisis
management could be exercised commensurate with strategic
objectives.
Soviet control of choke points, such as Babel el
Mendeb in the Gulf of Aden, the Straits of Hormuz, the
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Malacca Straits and the Mozambique Channel, all of which are
on major oil tanker routes, would prove most useful in such
a scenario. Soviet political initiatives to establish con-
trol of these choke points is already in progress. Addi-
tionally, client states that could disrupt shipping with
their limited naval assets are being supplied in this area
as well by the Soviets. Client states include Iraq, Ethio-
pia, South Aden (ports), Vietnam (Cam Rahn Bay), Mozambique,
Madagascar (port negotiations underway) , Angola and Libya.
All have leftist governments providing potential inroads for
the Soviet Union which greatly increase the range of and po-
tential for her navy in the areas over which oil must be
transported by sea.
By 1977, only about 12 percent of Gulf oil transited
the Suez Canal and Mediterranean pipelines [Ref. 203]. In
late 1976, the Suez-Mediterranean (SUMED) pipeline, running
320 kilometers from the Egyptian port of Ain el-Sukhna on
the Red Sea to the terminal of Sidi Kreir on Egypt's Mediter-
ranean coast was opened. SUMED 's current capacity is 1.6
million barrels of oil per day or a yearly capacity of 80
million tons [Ref. 204] . Widening and deepening of the Suez
Canal, started in the early 1970s, is nearing completion in
1982. As originally envisaged, expansion plans to increase
the Canal draught to between 67 and 70 feet would have al-
lowed fully loaded tankers of 270,000 deadweight tons and
partially loaded tankers of 300,000 deadweight tons to
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transit the canal. This improvement would save tankers now
having to round the Cape of Good Hope an average of 24 days
in the round trip to Western Europe [Ref . 205] . The actual
depth of the Canal when completed will be 77 feet, allowing
accommodation of even larger vessels than originally anti-
cipated [Ref. 206] . With relations prospering with Ethiopia
and South Yemen, the Soviets enjoy a degree of control over
the Babel el Mendeb. Libyan ties, not to mention the ex-
tensive Soviet naval capabilities in the Mediterranean,
present potential for disruption of shipping on the northern
approaches to Suez. Although the Convention of Constantino-
ple, signed by nine nations in 1888, guarantees that the
Suez Canal will be open to "every vessel of commerce or of
war, with out distinction to flag" [Ref. 207] , events in
1956 and 1967 have shown this to be less than a guaranteed
situation. Suez was closed to all traffic from November,
1956, to January, 1957, and again from 1967 to 1975 in the
aftermath of the Arab-Israeli War [Ref. 208] . Soviet naval
power and control of strategic choke points provides them
with the ability to disrupt oil transportation in a similar
manner
.
The sea lanes off the Cape of Good Hope are the most
crowded in the world with a daily passage of over 1.5 million
tons of oil [Ref. 209] . This route passes between Mozambique
cuid Madagascar as well as along the coast of Angola, all
states with increasingly strong Soviet ties. As has been
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mentioned previously, 73% of Japanese oil passes through the
Straits of Malacca. Proximity to the larger Soviet naval
base at Cam Rahn Bay makes this transit very subject to
Soviet interdiction.
Admiral Of The Fleet Of The Soviet Union Gorshkov has
stated that "The disruption of the ocean lines of communica-
tion, the special arteries feeding the economic potentials
of those (the enemy) countries, has continued to be one of
the most important of the (Soviet) Navy's missions" [Ref.
210] . As was demonstrated in the 197 3 Arab-Israeli War, the
Soviets are not reluctant to enter and operate at direct
odds with the United States in a combat zone if it is deemed
necessary [Ref. 211] . During this conflict, Soviet coverage
of choke points remained an integral part of the naval
mission [Ref. 212]
.
The extensive Soviet submarine fleet, and particu-
larly the diesel fleet which could work out of friendly
ports, would provide a formidable adversary for Western
anti-submarine warfare capabilities. Inability to conclu-
sively tie small scale submarine activity against tanker
ships to the Soviets could also afford them the capability
of disrupting oil flow without precipitating a crisis of
tremendous magnitude. Additionally, Western reluctance to
resort to nuclear war in such a scenario could offer the
Soviets potential for altering the "correlation of forces"
154

by denying the U.S. and NATO strategic oil availability and
forcing an economic stranglehold on Western Europe.
Disadvantages for the Soviet Union would undoubtedly
include the possible escalation of conflict with the United
States. Any direct strike at strategic assets might also
elicit a unified NATO response. Additionally, submarine
activity would quite likely bring about the involvement of
many nations because flag discrimination is nearly impossi-
ble. This would cause worldwide condemnation of the Soviet
Union and could work against the Soviets politically in the
long run.
Current Soviet force levels in the Indian Ocean in-
clude an average of eight surface combatants and fourteen
support and supply ships plus one or more nuclear and several
conventionally powered submarines [Ref. 213]. Even with the
aid of Soviet Naval Aviation and the use of mining techniques
in areas such as the Straits of Hormuz, this force is at
present much too small to offer the Soviets any possibility
of an all-naval confrontational scenario directed against
the West in the Indian Ocean. In that available Soviet as-
sets must be committed elsewhere, the prospect for this
scenario is extremely low for at least the next decade.
3. Indigenous Revolt or Soviet Proxy
The oil fields of Southwest Asia are vulnerable in
many respects. Primary among these is the disruption of oil
flow that can be accomplished by destruction of the oil
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fields, refineries, pumping stations, pipelines, and docking
facilities in the Persian Gulf. Even a small strike, such
as could be accomplished by a terrorist group, could decrease
oil output for months or even years. This situation places
Western interests in jeopardy from any conflict that might
arise indigenously, or that might be precipitated by a Soviet
proxy state.
Indigenous conflicts such as the state of civil un-
rest accompanying the fall of the Iranian Shah, the conflicts
in 1967 and 1973 between Egypt and Israel, or the continuing
Iran/Iraq conflict, all have to some extent decreased oil
availability from the Persian Gulf area. The potential for
larger scale conflict, or Muslim fundamentalist unrest
spreading to Saudi Arabia, is always a possibility. Any such
situation would certainly put Western interests in a pre-
carious situation.
Soviet ties, including massive arms transfers, with
client states in Southwest Asia including Libya, South Yemen,
Ethiopia and even Iraq could be used as a pretext for causing
a situation which would destabilize the region. Means of oil
production could be severely damaged, limiting flow to the
West and Japan. This in turn would have a significant ad-
verse effect on Western economies and, to use the Soviet
term, alter the "correlation of forces," political, economic
and military, in favor of the Soviet Union.
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In this situation, use of the U.S. Rapid Deployment
Joint Task Force (RDJTF) in a preemptive maneuver could prove
extremely beneficial. Immediate engagement forces could be
utilized at the request of a friendly government or govern-
ments to re-establish and maintain the status quo. Also,
introduction of U.S. forces quickly would up the ante (in-
crease risk) for the Soviet Union and limit her range of
rational response.
United States action in the event of regional armed
conflict in Southwest Asia would include but not be limited
to the following:
1. Economic, technical and political assistance.
2. Training and material assistance.
3. Encouragement of intervention by third party forces.
4. Threatened intervention with U.S. forces. [Ref. 214]
In the event of intra-regional conflict in the area, possi-
ble U.S. action would include;
1. Large scale concentration of U.S. forces.
2. Planning and execution of collective action with al-
liance partners
.
3. Provide security assistance to friendly states in the
area.
4. Provide multi-national naval force to ensure freedom
of navigation.
5. Provide air defense.
6. Control escallation. [Ref. 215]
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The establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council,
consisting of Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, the United Arab
Emirates and Kuwait in 1981 has gone a long way toward in-
creasing security in the area against this type of scenario.
Western and U.S. support in this venture would be most bene-
ficial to all concerned.
Realistically, adventurism on the part of the Soviet
client states has hurt rather than helped the Soviet image
in most cases. The Libyan leadership has often used Soviet
supplied equipment in a manner to discredit the Soviets for
potential complicity for irrational acts. Even the Arab par-
ticipation in the 1973 Middle East conflict placed the So-
viets in a position where they could have been shown to be
unable to support the interests of their clients [Ref. 216].
Any situation which would bring the Soviets to the brink of
a direct confrontation with the United States without full
Politburo political involvement can be seen as clearly
against Soviet interests
.
Soviet use of client states, such as the Cubans in
Angola, Ethiopia, and Latin America and the East Germans
throughout Africa has clearly been more effective [Ref. 217]
In a resource denial scenario in Southwest Asia, however,
such surrogated involvement would clearly necessitate Soviet
participation. This alone clearly decreases the potential




For any direct Soviet move against Southwest Asia 2
Airborne Divisions (CAT. I) , 21 Motorized Rifle Divisions
(CAT. II or III), 1 Tank Division (CAT. II or III) and 2
Tactical Air Armies (with 600 aircraft) would be available
[Ref. 218]. Though this is a considerable military force,
the Soviets would not be able to project such a force easily
into the Persian Gulf area. First, air superiority over the
region could not be assured without use of airfields in Af-
ghanistan. Second, in that there are only three routes
available into the area for Soviet troops, one to the west
of the Caspian Sea near Turkey and the other two through
mountain passes northeast of Tehran in Iran, Soviet military
access in a conventional scenario would be severely limited.
What would seem to be a situation with interior lines of
communication could easily be changed to exterior lines by
successful U.S. air interdiction and the anarchical situation
in Iran. Therefore, the use of nuclear assets to offset
other liabilities seems a more plausible and less risky
military alternative than a frontal assault on Western
Europe. This is especially true in that both options would
conceivably provide for the Soviets the same strategic
result.
For these regions, selective Soviet manipulation of
clients to advantage and long-term political overtures to
nations of Southwest Asia seems extremely plausible. Direct
military involvement, as long as the Soviet Union is not
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denied legitimate coininercial access to the resources of the
area, seems a remote possibility [Ref . 219]
.
F. REALITIES OF SOVIET POLICY IN SOUTHWEST ASIA^"""
While the denial of oil to the West is an extremely re-
mote possibility given current Soviet capabilities and limi-
tations, the Soviets would in all likelihood try to deny
this resource in a protracted conventional war. At present,
it does not appear that the Soviet Union will be a net oil
importer in the near future. Therefore, no short-term vital
interest exists for the Soviets in Southwest Asia for the
acquisition of this resource. Using the temporal domain
wisely, the gradual gains made politically in the area must
indicate that a steady, cautious but consistent political
course is better than reckless "adventurism".
The Soviets strongly believe that any war will be of
necessity fought against the entire capitalist world, not
to mention China, simultaneously. In that such a war must
never again be fought on Soviet soil, a preponderance of
concentration on offensive weaponry is evident in the Soviet
arsenal. This does not necessarily indicate an overtly hos-
tile and aggressive nature, however. The Soviets definitely
believe that time is on their side, and that the "correlation
21Valuable insights for this section were provided by
Captain Charles F. Turgeon, USNR, Commanding Officer, Naval
Intelligence Command Estimates Reserve Unit, in an interview
conducted in April, 1982.
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of forces" is not yet sufficiently in their favor to resort
to use of provocative military means. This is not to indi-
cate, however, that the Soviets won't resort to a display
of power if necessary. It only implies that a cautious,
opportunistic approach to politics in Southwest Asia can be
expected from the Soviet leadership.
The Soviet Union, like the United States, has a signi-
ficant interest in the Indian Ocean area. Transportation
facilities reaching to the eastern U.S.S.R. are inadequate
at best. Even the completion of a second (parallel) trans-
Siberian railway in the near future will not alleviate So-
viet logistical difficulties. For this reason, the route
through Suez and the Straits of Malacca is important to the
Soviet Union, particularly in winter. Any attempt to dis-
rupt Western oil access could result in a situation working
to the detriment of the Russians as well.
Diversification of oil resources for Western Europe as
well as the United States also limits the potential for
Soviet gains through overt action directed at the Persian
Gulf area. Inter-area security cooperation and the threat
of a U.S. response designed for quick entry into the area
and aggressive, combat and maneuver oriented strategic policy
will certainly decrease Soviet aggressive intentions through
increase of risk.
At this point in time, therefore, direct Soviet military
action in Southwest Asia is only a remote possibility. The
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only possible exception is if the situation in Iran degener-
ates, because of the border proximity to the Soviet Union.
A continued cautious but assertive course can be expected
from the Soviet Union, and therefore Western access to the
oil resources of Southwest Asia should not be in peril of




Since at least 1935, U.S. maritime policy has been re-
markably consistent. It has been shaped to large extent by
the realities of the competitive aspects of the American
merchant marine and shipbuilding. Unable to produce or crew
ships economically, U.S. policy has opted for a flexible
relationship with several flag of convenience countries,
with U.S. merchant marine policy largely evolving rather
than being formulated by conscious intent. The result has
been a system that meets both the nation's economic and
defense needs.
There are, unfortunately, some areas in which the U.S.
merchant marine needs improvement. Lack of dry bulk carriers
and refined petroleum product tankers are but two areas in
which the United States is distinctly lacking. In most
areas, particularly those critical to the economy, assets
are definitely adequate. As has been demonstrated in chapter
IV, the crude oil tankship industry has now an overcapacity
to transport oil imports and is likely to stay ahead of re-
quired capacity far into the future.
Few industries in the world are as capital intensive as
the shipping industry. Therefore, the health of that in-
dustry is linked particularly closely to the strength of the
economy. First, economic conditions determined both
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favorability and direction of trade. As trade contracts, so
also must the shipping industry. The reverse is true also.
Second, availability of investment capital at reasonable
interest rates is a prerequisite for continued replacement
of obsolete vessels. Without sufficient capital, the U.S.
shipping industry is sure to contract over time.
U.S. maritime policy has, without resort to excessive
subsidization, established a climate where investment capi-
tal is available to shipowners. The U.S. flag fleet is
stimulated directly through a legislative system of fiscal
and nonfiscal aids. The effective U.S. control fleet is
placed in a situation where profits not repatriated to the
United States are not subject to excessive taxation. This
induces fleet modernization and expansion. The result of
any attempt by Congress to enlarge the U.S. flag fleet at
the expense of flags of convenience would be prohibitively
high subsidization. The cost of that subsidization would be
of necessity shouldered by the American taxpayer.
There are, of course, disadvantages to the U.S. associa-
tion with flags of convenience. American merchant seamen
are forced to compete within the world labor market for jobs
Shipbuilding capacity is reduced through non-competitiveness
in the industry. Perhaps most important, the ability to
induce a structure on the type of assets in the American
merchant marine is lost by government to the private sector.
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without changing the system, however, incentives can be pro-
vided to correct deficiencies once identified.
The positive aspects of flags of convenience far out-
weigh any disadvantages. Evasion of neutrality in the years
leading up to World War II is an excellent example of a
policy which could not have been effected with a purely U.S.
flag fleet. Another example of the utility of the effective
control fleet is the economic benefit derived from it sub-
sequent to the 19 7 3 Yom Kippur War. On 28 October, 1973,
the Arab oil-producing states, in a show of solidarity with
Egypt and Syria, boycotted shipment of oil to the United
States. The manner in which this was effected was to pre-
vent U.S. flag vessels, or vessels bound directly for the
United States, from loading oil in Arab ports. Yet the oil
industry, primarily through U.S. -owned foreign-flag vessels,
was able to maintain continuity of worldwide oil distribu-
tion [Ref. 220]. Had U.S. maritime policy not evolved to
include the present relationship with Liberia and Panama,
this "convenience" to the United States would have been
denied.
Much has been made about an executive order issued by
the Liberian President during the 197 3 War prohibiting trans-
portation of oil to Israel on Liberian flag ships. It is
true such an order was issued, but it was retracted less than
24 hours later. In announcing the retraction, the effective-
control relationship between Liberia and the United States
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was reaffirmed by the President of Liberia. In fact, he
stated, his edict was never directed at ships effectively
controlled by the United States, but, rather, those owned
22by nationals of nations having no such relationship.
There has been some indication that the governments of
the Arab OPEC states are interested in exerting greater con-
trol over their resources through a concerted effort to gain
a major share of the oil transportation industry. This could
effectively negate advantages available to the United States
through the effective control fleet such as those enjoyed in
1974. As of 1980, however, OPEC countries held only 3.6
percent of the world's tanker fleet, while developed coun-
tries owned 52 percent [Ref . 221] . With profits in excess
of those that could be obtained by increasing an already ap-
parent over-capacity in tanker tonnage on the world market
already available through more secure investments , OPEC na-
tions are unlikely to pursue this option aggressively. The
Soviet Union, without question is in a position to disrupt
oil flows from Southwest Asia to the United States and West-
ern Europe. Through choke point tactics, support of terror-
ists or identification with surrogate states, this could be
accomplished by attacking U.S. seaborne means of oil trans-
portation directly or indirectly. Effective control assets.
22Discussion based on information provided by Mr. Eugene




however, provide a hedge against such an occurrence. Any
move by the Soviets against U.S. strategic seaborne oil
transportation would by nature be directed at assets of many
nations registered under flags of convenience.
U.S. merchant marine policy is well established in both
domestic and international law. It provides a significant
strategic capability without the costs that could be inherent
with it. It also provides a flexibility that few other mari-
time systems offer, in both the economic and military sense.
Therefore, unless major changes in U.S. maritime policy are
necessitated by unforeseen circumstances, the American flag,
American-owned and American controlled merchant fleet, and
particularly the tankship fleet, will continue to meet the
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